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 Review of Periodicals quate theoretical justification for upholding the obligation of stare decisis under the federal Constitution in almost any case where a citizen has reposed trust in a court's formu lation of the law and pecuniary loss would result from judicial instability. . . "The real key to these decisions lies in the fact Mr. Bryce lucidly expounds, taking Munn v. Illinois as his principal illustration, that the Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion. In his work, 'The Govern ment of England,' Mr. A. Lawrence Lowell states that the reason why the spoils system never obtained foothold in England was the prevalence of the 'sentiment that a man has a vested interest in the office he holds.' While this absurdly exaggerated conception never has been entertained here, American public opinion does demand, along with police pro tection of the peace, civil protection of vested rights asserted under private contract. The masses of the people are firmly persuaded that bad laws that are certain are better than good laws that are changeable. Continuity and consistency of judicial exposition are indispensable for faith to embark in enter prises extending into the future. Such deci sions as that by the Supreme Court of Iowa disregarded in the Gelpcke case and that by the New York Court of Appeals in the Muhlker case would introduce an element of South American insecurity into commercial life. General relaxation of the obligation of stare decisis would foster commercial anarchy." Constitutional Law (Power of the Courts). "The Constitutional Power and Relation of the State and Federal Courts," by J. C. Pritchard. Yale Law Journal (vol. xviii, p. 165). A historical review of the services of our courts in developing constitutional law. Their power to nullify acts of the legislative branch as unconstitutional is considered as un doubted and of the greatest service to the nation. Those who insist that this power does not exist are declared to proclaim "a doctrine no less dangerous to the public welfare than the conduct of him who by corrupt means seeks to pollute the fountains of justice. . ." Constitutional Law (Railroad Regulation). "An Inquiry into the Power of Congress to Regulate the Intra-State Business of Inter state Railroads," by David W. Fairleigh. Columbia Law Review (vol. ix, p. 38). Arguing "that Congress has the constitu tional power to regulate interstate railroads

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not only with respect to their interstate business, but with respect to their intra-state business as well, and thus to bring such rail roads wholly and exclusively under the regu lation of the national government." The line of argument is as follows:— "Having determined that the United States is an independent and sovereign government, with respect to the powers confided to it by the Constitution; that the Constitution granted to the Congress of the United States the power to regulate commerce among the states, which includes the power to regulate the agencies carrying on such commerce; that a railroad company is a public agency —an arm of government; that the Congress of the United States may create a railroad company to engage in interstate commerce, and grant to it the power of condemning private property for its use, we are prepared to proceed with the inquiry whether the public agency engaged in both interstate and intra-state commerce is in any wise different from the private agency, similarly engaged, and whether both alike must remain subject to regulation in part by the United States, and in part by the government of each state in which they may, respectively, carry on their business. That the private agency of interstate commerce must remain under such dual control, there can be no doubt. But that is not true of the public agency, because the public agency is a functionary of govern ment. Of what government is the interstate railroad company a functionary? Manifestly, it is a functionary of the independent sov ereign National State—the government of the United States. "Whenever a public agency falls within the sovereignty of a state government, it is an agency of that government, and the power of regulation rests wholly with the state government, without the possibility of the slightest interference from the government of the United States, unless the exercise of the power of regulation by the state violates, in practice, some right guaranteed by the federal Constitution. "On the other hand, whenever a public agency falls within the sovereignty of the United States, Congress has plenary power of regulation without the possibility of the slight est interference by any state government." A railroad wholly within a single state and not engaged in interstate commerce is under the exclusive regulation of that state; but