Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 21.pdf/55

 The Green Bag

42 DOMESTIC

LAW

ILLUSTRATED

A barrister, pleading a case, may courteously refer to an opposing advo cate as "my learned brother," and no breach of loyalty to a client is implied, when the "brother" is counsel for the client's bitterest enemy. In London there is a barrister who is frequently seen to plead before his father, who sits on the Bench, and two of the sons re cently appeared before their parent on opposite sides of a case at an Old Bailey trial. It does not seem to us that there would be any serious impropriety were the sons, under such circumstances, to address the Court as "my learned father." Lawyers are presumed to be capable of setting aside personal considerations in their disinterested loyalty to the stan dards of professional etiquette. If mem bers of the bar do this in their relations with one another, why should the same custom not hold in relations between bench and bar? Likewise with other family relation ships — why should such conversa tion as this, for instance, during the progress of a trial, not be perfectly proper, the good reputation of all the parties being taken for granted:— A FAMILY AFFAIR (Plaintiff's attorney is a woman who has been admitted to practice as a member of the Oklachusetts state bar. The judge presiding at the trial is her father; her nephew is attor ney for the defendant. The latter is ex amining a witness.) Plaintiff's Attorney (addressing the Court)— "My learned father, with your leave I will take exception to the question of my learned nephew." Attorney for Defendant (to the Court)— "My learned grandfather, I protest. My learned aunt, the counsel for the plaintiff, seems to have misunderstood the purpose of the question." The Court (to witness)—"You may answer the question put to you by counsel."

Witness (to the Court) — "Who shall I answer, papa, my sister or Charley?"

A POINT OF HONOR WITH THE JURY Not long ago in a small Western town a man was arrested for stealing a load of hay. He had deliberately driven upon a field, helped himself from a stack be longing to William Smith, and gone quietly away. Smith immediately brought suit, and the unfortunate man was dragged into court. The jury was sworn to hear carefully and without prejudice the testimony and render a verdict. The evidence developed that the accused man had bought a stack of hay from Sam Jones and had paid for it. Now it happened that Jones' and Smith's stacks of hay were on the same field and the taking of Smith's was only a mistake. The ac cused averred he believed he was taking what rightfully belonged to him. The prosecution was nonplussed and the case was submitted without argument, both attorneys honestly expecting an acquittal. Much to the surprise of all, the jury remained out for several hours, and as the sun sank below the horizon sent word that they could not agree. They were dismissed, and upon motion of the defence the justice dismissed the case. The curiosity concerning the action of the jury was so great that both lawyers stopped one of the men before he left the building and asked the reason for the disagreement. "Well," replied the juror, "we were all convinced that the fellow didn't mean any harm, and oughtn't to be held for stealing the hay, but there were three of us thought Smith should have pay for his hay."