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The Green Bag

pany it had a constitutional assurance that "all corporations shall have the right to sue in all courts in like cases as natural persons." In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Julian, 169 Fed. Rep. 166, an injunction was sought to prevent the operation of the statute. The Circuit Court granting the injunction char acterized the statute as an attempt to forfeit property or business because its owner exer cised a constitutional right in a lawful way, in a resort to the courts of his country for justice, and as transcending all the bounds of the legislative power, being a mere edict of despotism. No court which sits to admin ister the fundamental law can recognize it as a legitimate exercise of power. Gifts. Left Undelivered by Testatrix in Attorney's Hands— Principal and Agent. Ill. Testatrix, not caring to ameliorate the condition of her second husband after her death by leaving to him certain personal property given to her by her first husband, consulted her attorney in regard to it. She was advised that she could not make a valid bequest of it so as to deprive her husband of his interest therein, but to accomplish her purpose it would be necessary for her to deliver the property to the different persons she desired to have it. Subsequently, being confined to her bed, she called in her attorney, separated the articles, and the attorney marked the different parcels with the n mes and addresses of the persons for whom they were intended. The attorney delivered to her a receipt for the property, stating that the articles were to be given to the parties mentioned in memoranda contained in an envelope. This receipt was found pinned to the will when opened in the probate court. The attorney placed the articles in a private vault and the testatrix died before they were delivered. In Trubey v. Pease, 88 N. E. Rep. 1005, it was contended that the property was delivered to the attorney, not as agent of the testatrix, but as trustee for the donees, and operated to vest title in them immedi ately on its delivery to the trustee. After fully considering the testimony, the Court concludes that the attorney was merely the agent of the testatrix, and not a trustee for the donees, and that the agency was revoked by her death before delivery, and no title, therefore, passed to the donees. Interstate Commerce. See Employer's Lia bility, Federal and State Jurisdiction.

Marriage and Divorce. Annulment Re fused where Bride was Under Eighteen—Con struction of Statute. N. Y. Supreme Court Justice Greenbaum of New York, in refusing August 6 to grant the appli cation made by Mrs. Anna J. Kruger to have her marriage to Henry Kruger annulled on the ground that she was under eighteen when the ceremony took place, said that the right to bring the action in this case was based upon section 1743 of the New York Civil Code, which declared that a person who has not attained the age of legal consent may bring an action for annulment, but that it must be taken in connection with section 1742, which states upon what other conditions it may be brought, and which applies only to a woman under sixteen years of age. If an annulment of marriage, however, contracted "under sixteen may not be decreed where the marriage took place with the consent of parents, it follows that the legislature must have intended that an annulment may not be granted in the case of an infant above sixteen years of age and under eighteen where the consent of the parents, or guardian, had been obtained." Master and Servant. Unconstitutionality of Statute Requiring Explanation of Reason for Dismissal. Kans. A Kansas statute required an employer of labor, upon request of a discharged employee, to furnish in writing the true reason or cause of such discharge. In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 102 Pac. Rep. 459, it ap peared that one who had been discharged asked for the reason and was given a docu ment reading thus, "discharged for cause." He alleged that this information tendered by his erstwhile employer was too vague to acquaint him or any future employer with his objectionable deficiency if any. The Court ruled that the mere matter of time requisite to comply with the statute (s. 2422, Gen. Stat. 1901) was perhaps a matter of trifling consideration, yet, if the state may compel the sacrifice of a few minutes of the time of one person for another, may it not compel the sacrifice of days? In that event where and upon what principle shall the time limit be placed? Again, if the employer can be compelled to state the true cause of dis charge, it implies that he should state the facts as he understands them, and the facts may be in dispute and may be regarded by the employee as libelous. Litigation might