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 Notes of Cases defendant claimed an exemption, asserting that his employment was labor. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that even though proficiency in stenography was the reward of steady practice and experience, the stenogra pher exercises no discretion. If his employer indulges in the pastime of murdering the king's English, he must become particeps criminis and join in the assassination. No one who has gone through that backbreaking ordeal will hesitate to range it in the category of hard physical labor. A stenographer is entitled to a laborer's wage exemption. HOMICIDE. (Justifiable killing of pur suer.) Ot. App. Ga.—A negro woman com plained to the police that defendant, also a negro, had cursed her. Without having se cured a warrant an officer went to defendant's residence and having stated the purpose of his visit attempted to arrest him. Other officers had arrived and a crowd had as sembled when defendant, seizing a shot-gun, broke away and fled. He was shot at by the officers, sustaining several wounds. The crowd was yelling "shoot him," "kill him." One of them joined in the pursuit, running ahead of the officers. Defendant wheeled, shot and killed the pursuing citizen. In Holmes v. State, 62 Southeastern Reporter 716, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that even had the officer been provided with a warrant, shooting at one accused of a mis demeanor was unauthorized. The facts were sufficient to justify the fear of a reasonable man that his life was threatened, and the killing was justifiable homicide. INSURANCE. (Hunting deer for pleasure as engaging in act of professional hunter.) Ct. Civ. App. Tex.—One Lane insured him self as a "sheep farmer," agreeing that, if he were injured while doing any act pertaining to a more hazardous occupation, he was to receive the indemnity fixed for the latter. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Lane v. General Accident Ins. Co., 113 S. W. Rep. 324, held that insured, who was accidentally shot by a companiot while hunting deer for recreation, was entitled only to the indemnity fixed for a professional hunter. The court remarked that pursuing wild deer for the purpose of killing them was undoubtedly an act pertaining to the occupation of a hunter. INSURANCE. (Liability of insurer for fires caused by earthquakes.) U. S. 0. C.—The property of the insured was consumed in a

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general conflagration in San Francisco which had its origin in the earthquake of 1906. The fire was started at several points in the city and spread to the insured property. The policy provided that the company should not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by invasion ... or for loss or damage occa sioned by or through any earthquakes. In Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 Fed. Rep. 404, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the words "directly or indirectly" applied to invasions, they could not be made to embrace earth quakes; "occasioned" was equivalent to "caused"; the phrase "by or through" was a mere repetition of words, meaning the same thing; a loss indirectly caused by the progress of a fire from a distance, originally started by an earthquake, was without the exemption. NOTE The Civil Code of California contains the following provision: "When a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance, a loss which would not have occurred but for such peril is thereby excepted, although the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted" (§ 2628). The policy here specially excepted loss or damage "occasioned by or through earth quakes." The fire was communicated to the insured premises in the general conflagration which was originally started and caused directly by earthquake. It would therefore seem to make no difference whether we think that the peril specially excepted was earth quakes generally, or was fire caused by earth quakes, or was, as the court here holds, loss by fire caused directly by earthquakes. Whichever way we define the excepted peril, it is obvious that the loss would not have occurred but for such peril, and under the code section that is the sole test. Taking the narrowest view of the wording of the policy, the loss here would not have occurred but for the original loss by fire caused directly by the earthquake, which started the conflagra tion. Moreover the peril would seem to be the dangerous substance or occurrence which might be expected to cause loss—in other words, the earthquake. Loss by fire is the thing insured against, but it can hardly be what is referred to by the word peril in the California Code section. It is rather the re sult of the peril or the damage caused by the