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 Notes of Cases mentioned. They were unlike the native birds of their family, and were easily distin guishable both before and after culinary attention. It was contended that while the protection of the game supply was within the police power of a state, the law in ques tion was an unreasonable exercise thereof; that it was an unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce; that it denied due process of law. The United States Supreme Court held that a state had the power to make a law that would remove from its dealers the temptation to traffic in native game by also prohibiting them from handling foreign birds, and that the statute was not unconstitutional. CONTRACTS. (Patent ambiguities.) Mo. App.—The effect of a patent ambiguity in a lease is considered in Conservative Realty Co. v. St. Louis Brewing Association, 113 S. W. Rep. 229. The lease bound the lessor not to lease to another saloon in the block, and if said saloon license could not be secured on the premises, the lease should be void on ninety days' notice. No particular license had been mentioned, nor had the word "license" been used before in the instrument. The lessor contended that the stipulation meant that only in the event a single license for six months could not be procured, the lessee might end the term by giving the notice, whereas the lessee contended that if at any time during the five-year term a license could not be procured, he might sur render. The court says that, according to the old law, the patent ambiguity of the clause might make the stipulation void; but this doctrine is no longer enforced as strictly as formerly, and, whether an ambiguity is patent or latent, a court will endeavor to glean the intention of the parties from the whole instrument and the instances attend ant on its execution. Taking into account the law regarding saloon licenses, and the purpose for which the premises were taken by defendant, no doubt the intention of the parties was to make the existence of the lease contingent on the ability of defendant to procure from time to time a license; that is to say, defendant was accorded the privi lege of ending the term on ninety days' notice whenever it became impossible to obtain a license. NOTE It is a great pleasure to record one more case against the common statement that latent ambiguities may be explained by parol

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evidence but that patent ambiguities may not be. Parsons' discussion of the matter to which the court refers is good. Consult also an excellent essay by Professor Charles A. Graves printed in 28 Amer. Law Rev. 321. The Hibernian statement that the only ambiguities that cannot be cured by extrinsic or parol evidence are the incurable ones is no doubt the law. The sooner the alleged distinction between latent and patent ambig uities is forgotten the better. It does not exist. In fact, it never did exist. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 422-426, 471-474. CONTRACTS. (Release of promise of mar riage.) Oal.—A contract to support plaintiff in consideration of her releasing defendant from a promise of marriage is considered in Henderson v. Spratten, 98 Pac. Rep. 14. It appears that the parties cohabited after de fendant's promise to marry plaintiff, and at his instance and request she submitted to severe surgical operations, causing her seri ous injuries and unfitting her to marry and to perform domestic and wifely duties. In consideration of a subsequent agreement by plaintiff to release defendant from his promise of marriage he agreed to take care of her and support her as long as she suffered from her injuries. Defendant made payments on ac count of the contract even after the subse quent marriage and divorce of plaintiff. His claim was mainly that there was no considera tion for the contract and that there could be no novation of a void contract. In discussing this phase of the case the court says: These positions are based upon the ground that the contract of marriage was illegal and void because based upon an illegal consideration, but the testimony does not bear out the defendant's contention that the contract of marriage was based upon an illegal consideration. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that there were no illicit rela tions between her and the defendant until a long time after the defendant had promised to marry the plaintiff. Then, when the plain tiff agreed to release the defendant from the promise of marriage in consideration of his agreement to support and maintain her, and provide her with medical attendance, she was not substituting a valid contract for a void one, but she was making a legal contract and releasing the defendant from a legal con tract; and the law authorizes and allows con tracts of this character to be made, and, when