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 Latest Important Cases restrains the exchange, under the contract with the companies by which it is operated, from fixing rates of insurance, declaring the contract to be ultra vires, and says:— "A contract by which the directors of such corporations in conclusive form abdicate their duty of management in this respect (fixing of rates), and turn it over to an alien body, is in direct violation of the words and meaning of the statute, and is as typical an instance of an ultra vires act as can well be imagined. To do so in a given instance would be an illegal act, but the act of binding the cor poration by contract to a settled policy of illegal acts is beyond the power of the cor poration. That this is no academic critic ism appears clearly from the fact that the central association erected by the contract by which, through a sub-committee of five, rates are fixed, consists of but one representative of each constituent company. Hence, in a body of 121, the New Jersey companies have but eight votes, and in the sub-committee they have but one vote to four cast by for eign corporations. It is inevitable, there fore, that the influences affecting such foreign corporations, the losses they may have sus tained, the expenses they have incurred, the salaries they design to pay, the dividends they desire to declare, will all be reflected and asserted in the fixing of the rates to be charged for insurance to the citizens of this state." The complaint had alleged that as a result of the agreement rates were raised about sixty per cent, making it practically impossi ble to place insurance with any company not in the association. Monopolies. Sherman Act—Jobbers' Asso ciation Not Unlawful Combination. Mass. In overruling the defendant's demurrer in the suit of the Wheeler-Stenzel Company of Boston against the American Window Glass Company to recover $100,000 damages for maliciously inducing the National Window Glass Jobbers' Association to break a contract which the plaintiff had with it, the full bench of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided June 23 that the plaintiff had a right of action properly stated, and that there was nothing in the arrangement between the plaintiff and the association repugnant to the provisions of the Sherman act. The Court said:— "There can be no doubt, we think, that those included in the association had a right

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to combine and appoint a common agent, which, according to the allegations of the declaration, was, in effect, what was done, to make purchases of window glass for them, and to distribute the window glass so pur chased among them according to contracts severally entered into by them with such agent. It is not every combination that is unlawful or in restraint of trade under the Sherman act, but only such as tend directly to interfere with and to create a monopoly in or to restrain interstate commerce." Municipal Corporations. Ordinance Pro hibiting Seining Invalid—Legislative Powers of Municipality. Cal. The town of Santa Monica, Cal., passed an ordinance prohibiting seining within 1,000 feet of its docks. In Ex parte Bailey, 101 Pac. Rep. 441, the California Supreme Court thought it manifest from the terms of the ordinance that it was in no sense designed for the preservation and protection of fish for the benefit of the state. It was rather intended solely to protect and add to the piscatorial advantages of the wharves, docks, and piers in the town, for the benefit of its citizens. Hence it was clearly beyond the power of the town .to enact. Municipal Corporations. Notice of Acci dent Required by Statute—Time Not Ex tended for Disability. Neb. The charter of a municipality exempted it from liability for damages arising from a defective sidewalk, unless notice of the acci dent was filed within twenty days. Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice and snow which had been allowed to accumulate on a sidewalk, and sued for damages. By the fall he was instantly rendered unconscious and remained in that condition for more than twenty days, and was therefore unable to give the city notice of the accident within that time. In McCollum v. City of South Omaha, 121 N. W. Rep. 438, the Nebraska Supreme Court in an opinion from which Judge Fawcett dissented in terms of unmistakable strength and sever ity, held that the incapacity of plaintiff re sulting from his injury did not extend the time, or afford an opportunity for the fixing upon the city of its statutory liability. Negligence. Riding on Car Platform— No Contributory Negligence—Carrier's Duty to Care for Crowds. Kan. A passenger mounted the platform of a crowded street car wherefrom he was pushed