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 Reviews of Books BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPEFRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES France and the Alliances, the Struggle for the Balance of Power. By Andre Tardieu, Honorary First Secretary in the French Diplomatic Service. The Macmillan Co., N. Y. Pp. x, 309 Q index of names. M TARDIEU states in the preface that • this book covers in developed form the subject explained in a series of eight lectures given in 1908 under the auspices of the Cercle Francais of Harvard University. As he himself says, a Frenchman could not treat such a subject otherwise than from a French point of view. His view, never theless, has enabled him to express with ap parent perfect frankness the raison d'etre of the numerous alliances and agreements. He does not hesitate to point out what he deems to be the weaknesses of the French diplomatic service in several important crises, neither does he attempt to veil his belief in the inimical policy of Germany towards France. From time immemorial France, with a "badly protected northeastern frontier, has been obliged to seek allies in Europe." And this ancient conflict of interests seems to have influenced and to continue to influence every diplomatic arrangement in Europe. This and Germany's aggressive commercial actions demanded this balance of power, which is mainly sustained by the Franco-Russian Alliance. Out of these fundamentals M. Tardieu builds up a very interesting history of French diplomatic relations covering the period from the early 'seventies to the present moment. Russia, blind in attempting the Manchurian acquisition, and France, weak in allowing the attempt, with Russia's subsequent defeat, temporarily lightened the weight of the Franco-Russian Alliance as a balancing power, allowing Germany's Moroccan policy in the crisis of 1905-1906 to assume an inde pendent quality. By her demand for an international conference in the matter of agreements concerning Morocco, and forc ing France to accept it, "Europe was to be shown that Germany had only to oppose a certain policy for it to be altered in accord ance with her wishes." He points out the failing in judgment of M. Delcasse Minister

of Foreign Affairs,—"who, being aware that German opposition would be made sooner or later, not to his Moroccan policy, but to his general policy, however did not perceive that a France half disarmed both materially and morally was fatally condemned to yield. He willed the end, without willing the means." These facts, he says, are well proven when "Germany demolished the minister who had vaunted of holding his own against her with out, indeed, his doing anything to render himself capable of such action." Expressing his belief that financial, com mercial, or circumstantial influences are most potent in developing understandings between countries, this author points out that the French loans to Russia of twelve billions of francs are a strong bond of mutual interest, and that England's interest in a French-English Alliance, which he does not believe at present to be advantageous, is born of a fear of German colonial aggression. He quotes English consular reports showing Germany's predominance in England's nat ural markets, which reports also accuse Ger man manufacturers of misuse of foreign trademarks and other doubtful business methods. In a chapter on "Asiatic and European Un derstandings", in which he explains the diplo matic interest of Europe in Japanese policy and Chinese commerce, the author expresses regret at the want of clear-sightedness on the part of the French and Russian Ministers when Marquis Ito, the Japanese Envoy, visited their respective capitals in 1901, in ne glecting the opportunity "to conclude with him a piece of business advantageous" to themselves, leaving to England the oppor tunity for agreements which, but for want of promptness, might have been theirs. In the chapter on France and the United States a little more of the value of "senti ment" is expressed: "Franco-American rela tions have been developed in an atmosphere of reciprocal sympathy. ... To exaggerate the action of this 'imponderable' would be to expose one's self to errors. To deny it would be to run into them." An interesting, read able chapter. In the concluding chapter, "France and Peace," the author says: "France has accom