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 Review of Periodicals torical justification, from our constitutional jurisprudence antedating the Fourteenth Amendment." "Ethics and the Law." By Prof. George Trumbull Ladd. 18 Yale Law Journal 613 (June). "From the point of view of one who is a layman and so interested chiefly in the moral aspects of our problem, the following consid erations which bear upon its solution, seem undoubtedly to be true: First, very important and even radical changes in the existing sys tem of laws are demanded, and will be in sisted upon in the near future by the public conscience of the body of the people then living under the law. Second, the tendency to invade and restrict the territory of indi vidual rights—uniformly in the alleged inter ests of the whole people, but far too often, in ways either ignorant, if altruistic, or skill fully and designedly planned to promote the interests of a corporation or a class—must either reach its natural limit or else be checked by legal methods. And, third, and above all else, these changes in legislation and in the enforcement of the laws by the courts must secure to the minority their rights as against the majority, and to the humblest and poorest individual his rights as against the richest and most powerful corporation. Only in this way can the truest and highest social good under the law be realized and maintained; and only thus can the essence of our Constitution and of our hitherto ex isting system of law be preserved, in the good conscience and respectful obedience of the people of the land." See Government. Capital Punishment. "Does Capital Pun ishment Prevent Convictions?" By Maynard Shipley. 43 American Law Review 321 (May-June). "From the facts already presented with reference to the administration of justice before and after abolishment of capital pun ishment in Michigan, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Maine, and Colorado, it seems evident that convictions followed murders with greater certainty after life imprisonment was made the supreme penalty. Perhaps we may well agree with Professor John Dewey, of the Chicago University, that while there may be circumstances under which the death pen alty is necessary, on the other hand, 'where the moral opinion of the community is highly developed and where scientific penology has made considerable progress, it is likely to be more harmful than helpful.'" Conflict of Laws. "Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws." By Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. 9 Columbia Law Review 492 (June). The first portion of a paper to be concluded next month. The topic was suggested by the decision in the important English case, Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Furness, which

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the same author has also discussed in an earlier article in the same journal ("Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Cor poration Debts," 9 Col. L. Rev. 285-320, re viewed 21 Green Bag 229). "In King v. Sarria, the analogous principles and authorities thus far considered point clearly to the lex loci contractus as the general rule for determining the obligations of the special partner to third persons. This would seem to be particularly true of the agency cases, Maspons v. Mildred, relating to an undisclosed principal, and Arayo v. Currell, bearing on the limitation of a principal's obligation. So, too, special emphasis may be placed on Baldwin v. Gray, for that case is almost a 'converse' to the one immediately to be considered. Of the authorities directly in point King v. Sarria is the leading case. . . . "The stockholders in a foreign, limited lia bility corporation contracting in New York do not, in general, become subject to the obligations of ordinary partners; but no case has been observed in which it is suggested that this is due to any absence of power on the part of the lex loci contractus. On the contrary, the opinions in the New York cases expressly indicate that the New York law, if so declared by the legislature, might legiti mately impose such partnership obligations, and in other jurisdictions there are actual decisions which have held that, independently of statutes, such obligations result under some circumstances." Copyright. "Copyright at Home and Abroad." By W. Morris Coles. Nineteenth Century, v. 65, p. 1056 (June). "' Vraisemblablement fort complexe' is the phrase in which M. Henri Morel, the Director of the International Copyright Bureau, has aptly characterized the Berlin Convention, 1908. ... It is much in a peddling age for the powers in conference to strike boldly at making intellectual property more and more valuable, and surrounding it with a ring fence shall ensure its full and free enjoyment to its rightful owners. . . . "The new Convention is, however, unhappy in its method. It attempts too much. It is framed with too lofty a disregard for the difficulty of working it in the several coun tries. . . The position may be briefly stated. The Berne Convention of 1886, with the Additional Act of Paris, 1896, and the Decla ration of Paris, 1896, with all their imperfec tions, established a working international body of law. Round this in all the signatory countries a formidable weight of statutory and judicial authority has grown up, until we have arrived at some sort of certainty as to the rights of copyright owners, in the main, throughout the Union and, in part, throughout the civilized world. A network of protection has been created which, for all its drawbacks, is not the less capable of being practically worked, so far as the great mass of intellectual property is concerned. . . . "The framers of the Berlin Convention,