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of such child by reason of having been ap pointed its legal guardian. Illegitimate Children. May be Legitimized Without Mother's Consent. Okla. The right of a father to legitimize his il legitimate child without the consent and against the will of the mother is sustained in Allison v. Bryan (Okla.) 97 Pac. 282, 18 L.R.A.(N.S.) 931. Interstate Commerce. Shipments of Intoxi cants—State Cannot Control Interstate Con signments. U. S. The Supreme Court of the United States rendered a decision May 24 in favor of the Adams Express Company. The company had received a shipment of liquor purchased at Nashville, Tenn., forwarded it through New Albany, Ind., and delivered it to the consignee at Bonnieville, Ky. A statute of Kentucky prohibits railroads from delivering liquor to known inebriates. The express company was prosecuted by the state of Kentucky, and the Hart County Court ad judged the shipment not to be of an inter state character. The express company then sued out a writ of error, and the United States Supreme Court, in a decision rendered by Justice Brewer, held that the federal govern ment alone had the power to regulate inter state liquor shipments. Justice Harlan dis sented. Intoxicating Liquors. Municipal Ordi nance—Municipal Offense Distinct from State Crime. Ga. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld on May 18 section 1537 of the Atlanta city code, holding that Atlanta has the right to enact an ordinance subjecting to a fine not exceeding $500 all persons keeping spirituous, fermented, or malt liquors for unlawful sale. The headnote of the decision reads: "A municipality may, under its ordinances, punish the offense of keeping intoxicating liquors on hand for the purpose of illegal sale; and it makes no difference in a particular case that the keeping of the liquor for this purpose was at a place of business or other public place. The municipal offense is distinct and separate from the state crimes which may have been incidentally committed in connection with it." See also Interstate Commerce, Women's Rights. Marriage and Divorce. Decree Obtained by Perjured Testimony will not be Vacated. Mass.

A decree of divorce secured through fraud practised on the Court cannot be vacated, is the ruling of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Grace R. Zeitlin v. Adolph Zeitlin. The petitioner sought to have the decree vacated on the ground that the case for a divo rce had been made out at the hearing by perjured testimony, knowingly procured by the libellant. Judge Fessenden, on being satisfied that fraud had been prac tised on him, had vacated the decree. The Supreme Court reverses the decision of Judge Fessenden, and says: "It is against public policy to open cases on no other ground than this. In Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361, Chief Justice Shaw pointed out clearly the objections to setting aside a decree for divorce upon an application in subsequent proceedings. One of the facts to which he referred, namely, a marriage upon the faith of the decree and birth of a child of the marriage, exists in the present case." Municipal Corporations. Duty as to Streets — Ordinary Travel Includes Bicycling. Ill. A fifteen-year old boy rode a bicycle into a hole in a Chicago street and permanently injured his hip. The hole in the pavement was from ten to fifteen inches deep and full of water, and the lower court instructed the jury that "a city is not bound, under the law, to keep its streets absolutely safe, nor is it bound, under the law, to keep them in reason ably safe condition. It is only bound to use reasonable care to keep its streets reasonably safe for ordinary travel thereon by persons using due care and caution for their safety." The request of the defendant, the city of Chicago, for an instruction that ordinary travel did not include the riding of a bicycle, and that the jury would have to find for the defendant if convinced that the street was reasonably safe for ordinary travel, was refused. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in affirming the judgment, which was hostile to the city, upheld the instructions given by the lower court and ruled that riding a bicycle on a street is an ordinary mode of travel. "A highway in the country need not be of the same character as a street in a large city," said the Court. "Just what degree of care the rider of a bicycle, the driver of a team or the chauffeur of an automobile must exercise must depend very largely upon the character of the road and the surroundings in each special case." Molway v. City of Chicago, Chicago Leg. News, May 29, p. 348.