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 Latest Important Cases purpose of affording to the other his just and reasonable rights in the highway. When two cars meet it is the duty of each so far as prac ticable to yield to the other the space and opportunity necessary for its safe and con venient passage. In the case of two cars traveling in the same direction the front one has the superior right and may maintain its position in the centre of the highway if there is sufficient space on its left as prescribed by statute to enable the approaching car safely and conveniently to pass." Per Hiscock, J. Bankruptcy. Ancillary Receivership— Assets in Another Jurisdiction. U. S. The United States District Court for the western district of Pennsylvania, in Matter of Dunseath & Son Co. and Robert Dunseath, Bankrupts, decided March 22, 1909, granted a petition for an ancillary receiver to aid the District Court for the southern district of New York in administering the bankrupts' estate, and ruled that when a receiver in bankruptcy is appointed in one district and assets of the bankrupt estate are located in another district, the District Court for the district within which such assets are located cannot, upon the petition of the receiver, stay the state officers and order them to deliver the assets within its jurisdiction to the receiver appointed in such other district. The Court said:— "Rightly interpreted, we believe the true doctrine is that this is an effective national system of administering insolvent estates, giving to the court of the domicile full power to administer the estate and giving to other courts of like jurisdiction beyond the bound ary of the primary court full authority to aid by its decrees and processes that primary court so that all the assets of the bankrupt may be at last brought into the primary court for distribution. We believe the author ity of the district courts of sister jurisdictions is auxiliary and ancillary for the purpose of making the act effective. Many cases might be cited showing the ancillary powers in sister courts outside of those pertaining to bank ruptcy." Breach of the Peace. Giving the Lie Suffi cient. Ga. In Rumsey v. Bullard, 63 S. E. Rep. 921, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that it was prepared to take judicial cognizance of a fact which as individuals they well knew— that in Georgia to call a man a liar, even with

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out raising a stick, usually provokes a breach of the peace, and generally brings on a fight. Exceptions to this rule, said the Court, find meager nourishment on Southern soil and beneath Southern skies. Building Restrictions. Police Power—Pub lic Health and Safety. U. S. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Francis C. Welch v. Building Com missioner of Boston, decided May 17, has ruled upon a matter of concern to every city in the country having tall buildings. The Court upheld absolutely the right of a state, under the police power, to limit the height of buildings in an arbitrarily determined section of a city without offering compensation to property owners. An act of the Massachu setts Legislature, passed in 1904, dividing the city of Boston into two sections, and limiting the height of buildings in the former to 125 feet, was held constitutional. The case was the first that had come before the Supreme Court on the question of building restriction. The Court held that the restriction was rea sonable and properly in the interest of the public health and safety. "Commodities Decision." Hepburn Act— Commodities Clause Construed—Meaning of Indirect Ownership and Interest. U. S. The commodities clause, so-called, of the Hepburn Act, which act was approved June 29, 1906, provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport" be tween states "any article or commodity other than timber" which it produces, "or which it may own, in whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect," except articles needed in the conduct of its business. The anthracite railroads at which this clause was aimed got the lower courts to declare it confiscatory and unconstitutional. The case then came before the United States Supreme Court, which rendered on May 3 a decision sustaining the constitutionality of the clause, but adopting a construction of its terms which has been generally considered favorable to the defendants, the Pennsyl vania, Erie, Reading, Jersey Central, Dela ware and Lackawanna, Delaware and Hudson, and Lehigh Valley roads. In construing the clause, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice White, decided that the prohibition applies only to the following circumstances and conditions:—