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The Green Bag

question involved was whether the means used in the endeavor to make the strike effective were lawful or unlawful. In discussing this question, the Court draws a clear line of demar cation. It says that in contests between capital and labor, the only means of injuring each other that are lawful are those that operate directly and immediately upon the control and supply of work to be done and of labor to do it, and thus directly affect the apportionment of the common fund, for only at this point exists the competition, the evils of which organized society will endure rather than suppress the freedom and initiative of the individual. But attempts to injure each other by coercing! members of society who are not directly concerned in the pending controversy, to make raids in the rear, cannot be tolerated by organized society, for the direct, the primary, attack is upon society itself. In illustration of these principles, it is shown that the rights of contestants are fairly balanced. Employers may lock out, or threaten to lock out, employees at will with the idea that idleness will force them to accept lower wages or more onerous conditions, and employees at will may strike, or threaten to strike, with the idea that idleness of the capital involved will force employers to grant better terms. On the other hand, an em ployer having locked out his men will not be permitted, though it would reduce their fighting strength, to coerce their landlords and grocers into cutting off shelter and food, and employees having struck will not be permitted, though it might subdue their late employer, to coerce dealers and users into destroying his business. Monopolies. Arkansas Anti-Trust Act— Fourteenth Amendment—Pleading—Due Pro cess of Law. U. S. i In Hammond Packing Co. v. State of Arkan sas, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, which was de cided by the Supreme Court of the United States Feb. 23, the Arkansas anti-trust act of Jan. 23, 1905, was upheld as not taking property without due process of law, nor denying the equal protection of the laws, nor impairing contract obligations, nor permitting unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Jus tice White in his opinion, among the numer ous points treated, held that the ruling in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed- 215, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 841, was not applicable to the case in hand, but that on the contrary an honest, unavailing effort of the corpora

tion to produce books and papers and secure the attendance of its officers before a com mission, will prevent the striking out of its answer and entering of a default judgment in a suit in which it may be made a defendant, and in the absence of such an effort a judg ment by default after failure to produce material evidence in the pleadings would not be a denial of due process of law. Monopolies. Indiana Anti-Trust Act—Con stitutionality. Ind. The Indiana anti-trust act was upheld as constitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court in Miller v. Knight & Jillison Co. et al., decided March 16. The plaintiff alleged a combination in restraint of trade on the part of master plumbers and dealers in plumbers' supplies. The Court held that such a com bination was within the rule so often applied to railroads, that makes their charges for property and services subject to regulation and control. Negligence. Street Railways— Rate of Speed —Sounding Gong at Crossings. D. C. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in City & Suburban Ry. v. Cooper {Washington Law Reporter, Apr. 2, 1909, pp. 216-218), decided Mar. 2, 1909, decided that the question of the defendant's negli gence was for the jury, in an action for per sonal injuries, where there was evidence that the car was approaching a crossing at a rate of speed greater than that prescribed by the police regulation, and no gong had been sounded before the car crossed the street, and there was also evidence that a witness had called to the motorman as he approached the crossing, but that the motorman was wiping his mouth with the hand with which the brake was applied, and apparently did not take notice of witness' warning until the car was at the curb line and too late to avoid collision with the wagon on which plaintiff was riding. The Court also held that the duty of stopping to look and listen, of general application in cases of steam railway cross ings, cannot be applied in a strict sense to street railway crossings. Negligence. Telephone Companies—Failure to Answer Emergency Call Promptly. Ky. The liability of a telephone company for danger resulting from delay in calling the fire department, is discussed in Lebanon L. & L. Telephone Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 115 S. W. Rep. 824. Plaintiff alleged substan