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dence, the pleadings shall be amended and, if necessary, the case continued, in order that the truth shall be made manifest and a party with unclean hands deprived of the relief that he craves." International Marriages. "The English View of Capacity in International Marriages." Editorial Note. 22 Harvard Law Review 439 (Apr.). "In the light of the adjudged cases and the language used in deciding them, it is diffi cult to say whether an English court will apply the lex loci or the lex domicilii to deter mine matrimonial capacity. ... It is sub mitted that the domiciliary theory expresses more accurately the present state of English law." A somewhat analogous question is dis cussed by another writer. "The Law Ruling the Moveables of Americans Married in France or in Belgium without any Settlement or Marriage Contract." By Emile Stocquart. 18 Yale Law Journal 399 (Apr.). When an American woman marries a Frenchman or Belgian, the question what law governs the moveables, if there has been no marriage contract or settlement, becomes im portant. The principle that when there is not an express contract, a tacit contract evi denced by the intention to make choice of a matrimonial domicile in another country than the husband's regulates the rights of husband and wife to their moveables, seemed to be a well established principle in French juris prudence; but it proved difficult to ascertain the parties' intentions, and courts adopted the doctrine that "a person's civil rights are, in the cases to which English and American Courts apply the law of his domicile, to be determined not by such law, but by the law of the country or state to which he belongs by allegiance or citizenship." The proposed convention of The Hague, 1904, gives up the law of domicile and adopts that principle of nationality which generally applies in Europe, though not in the United Kingdom. This view may be generally taken by the courts in the near future. Master and Servant. See Employers' Lia bility, Labor Regulation. Measure of Damages (Conversion). "Meas ure of Damages When Property is Wrong fully Taken by a Private Individual." By Hugh Evander Willis. 22 Harvard Law Re view 419 (Apr.). "The rule of damages adopted and applied by many of our state courts and by our United States Supreme Court is unjust and an outrage on the rights of property. . . . "The true rule should compensate the inno cent party for the labor and expense he has bestowed upon the chattels to the extent their value is enhanced thereby, but it should give all the other advantages of ownership to the owner. Thus, if A inadvertently tres

passes on B's land and cuts timber, when its value standing is three dollars a thousand and after severance four dollars a thousand, and he then transports it to his saw-mill and saws it up into boards at a total expense of five dollars a thousand, but at that time and place the value of the lumber is twenty dollars a thousand, B should be allowed to sue A in any form of action and recover either the lumber or its present value of twenty dollars, less five dollars a thousand." Mines. "Important Recent Decisions on Mining Law." By R. B. Michell. 19 Madras Law Journal 1 (Jan.). This paper discusses the effect of subsidence of the surface on the rights of owners and occupiers of lands containing coal mines, in the light of the recent decision of the English Court of Appeal in Butterley Co. Ltd. v. New Hucknall Colliery Co. Ltd. (25 Times Law Reports 45, L. R. (1908) W. N. 221.) Monopolies. "The Sherman or Anti-Trust Act." By J. H. Benton, LL.D. 18 Yale Law Journal 311 (Mar.). "At the last session of Congress, a bill was introduced by Mr. Hepburn and hence known as the 'Hepburn Bill, to carry out the Presi dent's recommendation. . . . "Of this bill it can well be said that the remedy proposed by it is worse than the disease. . . . "The fact is that the reason why the Sher man Act has not been efficiently enforced is because it is an unenforceable statute. It is as useless to enforce it generally and uni formly, according to its plain provisions, as it would be to attempt to enforce a statute regulating the price of commodities or the intrinsic value of money. The Act is an attempt to control commercial and economic forces by statute, and like all similar Acts, must ultimately either fall into entire disuse, or be repealed, after having caused, as such statutes always do, more or less injury to the community. "The remedy for the evils of the Act is not in providing cumbrous, mischievous and un workable methods for avoiding some of them, but by substituting for it, so far as the public welfare requires, a properly framed, guarded and workable Act, with proper provisions for its efficient and uniform enforcement." See Interstate Commerce, etc. NegUgence. "Negligence and the Act of God." By Wilbur Larremore. 18 Yale Law Journal 338 (Mar.). Speaking with approval of the doctrine of Railroad Company v. Reeves, 1869, 10 Wall. 176, and a number of cases following it in different states, the editor of the New York Law Journal expresses the opinion:— "In the obvious interests of justice, a direct exception should be grafted upon the theory of proximate and remote causes by holding that whenever a person by his, or its, negli gence exposes the person or property of