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 Notes of Cases mules as security for a loan from the bank, which at maturity was not repaid. By con sent of all parties the mules were sold free of all liens for $468.00. Thereafter petitioner claimed an exemption of $300.00 therein. From the quandary as to whether those mules were wearing apparel, household or kitchen furniture the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals delivers us by deciding that the exemption is confined to specific articles and that peti tioner, having waived his right to property without the exemption, cannot reclaim it. BONOS AND MORTGAGES. (Action under foreign statutes.) N. Y.—The parties to a bond and mortgage on real property in New Jersey were residents of that state. Plain tiff in Hutchinson v. Ward, 85 N. E. Rep. 390, was the assignee of the obligee of the bond. The action was brought in New York to recover an amount remaining due on the bond. 2 Gen. St. N. J. 1895, p. 2111, as amended by Act March 23, 1881 (P. L. 1881, p. 184) provides that where a bond and mortgage are given for the same debt an action may be brought on the bond within six months after foreclosure for any deficiency, and that judgment for the creditor shall open the foreclosure entitling the mortgagor to sue within six months to redeem. On the question of suing in New York, the court asserts that plaintiff was not attempting to enforce some pecuniary liability or remedy created by a foreign statute. He was seek ing to enforce a common law obligation, which had not wholly lost its force. The action was transitory and maintainable out side the state where the contract was made. The provisions of the New Jersey statute, however, were a part of the contract, and regulated the manner of performance. The action was commenced within the statutory period of six months after the sale of the mortgaged premises. As the statute was general as to any suit on the bond and as to the effect of a recovery thereon, such a recovery would open the foreclosure sale and permit the judgment debtor to redeem. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Validity of bulk sales law.) LI.—The Bulk Sales Law of Illinois provides that all sales of merchandise not in the usual course of trade will be pre sumed to be fraudulent unless certain formal ities designed to protect creditors are com plied with. Without regard to these provisions one who had been unsuccessful in tbe grocery business sold her stock at a fair

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price and applied the proceeds on a note which she owed a bank. In Charles J. Off 6V» Co. v. Morehead, 85 N. E. Rep. 264, it was con tended that this sale was void on the sole ground that the formalities required by the Bulk Sales Law had not been observed. The Supreme Court of Illinois held this act un constitutional as it singled out persons of a particular class, and imposed burdens upon them from which all other classes are exempt, thus depriving them of liberty and property, in that they are not permitted to contract in respect to a particular kind of property subject to the same laws applicable to other classes of property, and hostile to those pro visions of the Bill of Rights providing that all men have certain inherent rights, includ ing life, liberty, etc., and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property with out due process of law. CORPORATIONS. (Agreement between two factions regarding selection of directors.) Ga.—An agreement between two factions of the shareholders of a railroad company incor porated by the secretary of state, to the effect that one of such factions owning half of the corporate stock shall have the right in definitely to name a majority of the directors of the company, and thus manage and control its affairs, is held, in Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1136, to be against public policy, and void. CORPORATIONS. (Gross earnings.) Minn. —As to what income or earnings received by a railway company should be included within the term "gross earnings" was the question recently before the Supreme Court of Minne sota in State v. Minnesota 6V* /. Ry. Co., 118 N. W. Rep. 679. The corporation contended that the term was limited to the receipts and expenditures on account of the operation of the railroad, and that if it were taxed upon its gross earnings received in operating leased portions of the track and the lessor corporation also were taxed, double taxa tion would result. The court held that earn ings received by railway companies while per forming work incident to, or connected with, the business of transportation, and which may reasonably be considered within the scope of their corporate powers, constitute "gross earnings." Within the case two minute classifications are made, the amount received for the use of the equipment, such as steam shovels, work trains, etc., falling within the term, and money received from the sale