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THE GREEN BAG

Sup. Ct. — The decision in II. Koehler & Co. v. Clement, in New York Supplement, 151, illus trates the fact that frequently the disposition of a case depends on the meaning of a single word. The liquor tax law of New York provides for payment of rebates on surrender of licenses by persons " authorized to sell liquors under the provisions of the act." The right to traffic in liquors is forbidden to any person " convicted for a violation of this act, until three years from the date of such conviction." Relators' claim to a rebate as assignees of a certificate issued to one Levy was resisted on the ground that Levy had been so " convicted " within three years preceding the date of issuance of his license and was consequently not "authorized" to sell liquors. It appeared that he had been tried on such a charge and found guilty but sentence had been suspended and the time within which it might be imposed had expired. The court, fol lowing by analogy the case of People v. Fabian in N.Y. Supp. 140, involving the right to vote, decided that the conviction was complete so as to vitiate the certificate in the hands of Levy, and as he was not thereby authorized to engage in the liquor business, he would have no right to a rebate. The assignee's rights were held to be no greater than those of the original holder, and recov ery was denied. NEGLIGENCE. (Osteopaths.) Vt. — In an ac tion for malpractice, against osteopaths, the Supreme Court of Vermont in Wilkins v. Brock, 70 Atl. Rep. 572, after giving the jury the rule as to the care defendants were bound to exercise if they treated the case as osteopaths, instructed them as to the rule applicable to the profession generally if they found defendants did not treat the case as osteopaths. This was held error, there being no evidence that they treated the case otherwise than as osteopaths, and osteopathy being a distinct school of practice, the treatment was to be tested by the principles and practice of that school, and not by the principles and practice of any other school, nor of the profession generally. NEGLIGENCE. (Places Attractive to Children.) Cal. — The plaintiff in Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone & Co., 96 Pac. Rep. 84, a youth 12 years of age, was injured by a push car left standing un guarded on a railroad track in the street. The Court, in reviewing the case, holds that it is not distinguishable from the " turntable cases," and affirms the doctrine that a person who places an attractive but dangerous contrivance in a place frequented by children, knowing, or having reason to believe, that they will be attracted to it and subjected to injury thereby, owes the duty of exercis

ing ordinary care to prevent such injury, because lie is charged with knowledge of the fact that children are likely to be attracted thereto, and are usually unable to foresee and avoid the danger into which he knowingly allures them. NEGLIGENCE. (Railroad Hospital.) Mo. Sup. Ct. — In the case of Phillips v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., ii j S. W. Rep. 109, an action to recover for the negligent killing of plaintiff's husband, it appeared that the railroad company maintained a hospital for the benefit of its employees. The revenue for operating this institution came largely from small sums deducted from the salaries of the employees. Phillips had been treated there. One morning he was permitted to take passage, unattended, on one of defendant's trains bound for St. Louis, his home. This train arrived about seven o'clock that evening, and deceased left it. About nine o'clock that night, a man, partially dressed and in condition to retire, while lying across a street car line was run over and killed by a passing car. Two weeks later the body was exhumed and identified as that of Phillips. Two days after the death of decedent, but before either of these parties had learned of it, the chief surgeon of the hospital wrote to the general auditor in St. Louis, telling him that Phillips was mentally unbalanced and should be sent to an asylum for treatment. This letter was excluded by the trial judge. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the hospital association was but an agent of defend ant, and the negligence of these agents was the negligence of defendant. The letter was in the nature of an official report from one chief official of defendant to another, and should have been admitted. NUISANCE. (Advertising Signs.) N. Y. Sup. Ct. — An interesting opinion affecting advertising was rendered by Judge Leventritt of the Supreme Court of New York in Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. City of New York, in New York Supplement, 759. Plaintiff operated along Fifth Avenue a line of automobile stages on which were carried advertising signs of tobacco and cigarettes. These signs were painted in glaring colors in large letters, contrasted so as to attract attention, and not blended to produce a harmonious or artistic effect, the result being a disfigurement rather than an ornament. Defendant insisted that these signs constituted a nuisance. The court said: "These advertisements cannot be said to injure or endanger comfort, repose, health, or safety. They do not produce any describable physiological effect. At most, they are offen sive to the eye and to the aesthetic taste. It would be a dangerous undertaking, said Judge Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing