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 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT the river with the driver and vehicle, the bridge being destitute of a railing. The town defendant argues that no ordinary railing would have restrained the horse anyhow. So, cut bonof argues the town's counsel. Reply: Railings are required " not merely to resist the force of the horse when terrified and unmanageable, but chiefly to guide the eye of the animal, and give it a " sense of confinement within them." (i Aiken (Vt.) at p. 860.) Even- counsel with a similar case might not sua sponte think of that. (2) Equally impressive is the steady in sistence shown in the present work upon the juridical value of psychology. Much of our nomenclature, subtly guiding our thinking, savors of formality and materialism. The law of evidence is no exception. So excellent an authority as Stephen defines " evidence as the statements of witnesses or documents sub mitted to the judge's inspection." We repeat the ancient formularies; say, with Greenleaf, that " Evidence is any matter of fact, the effect, tendency or design of which is to produce, etc." Really this is to repeat Aristotle and the Year Books. It is becom ing more clearly realized that no statement in and of itself is truly " evidence " if it be a lying one; no declaration of a document is evidence if the declarant knew nothing as to what he was writing or perverted it all. Only as mind is present in the statement, as the subjective mental condition of the declar ant adds probative force to his statement, is there " evidence." Proof presents a problem in psychology. Every question to a witness on direct or cross examination is an attempt to search his mind. The vocal sounds he makes, the characters he writes, even the demeanor he exhibits, are merely signs and tests of his mental state. Mr. Moore will help to make us see this. How the wondrous needle of attention grooves in mind stuff, or the cortex of the brain, its sense impressions; how once more, in memory, the needle may again be placed on these grooves and repro duce the same image; what makes the needle cut deeply, what causes it to make scarcely a mark or what forces it to diverge into cognate or false impressions, Mr. Moore has told us in his splendid chapters on Observa tions and Memory. Others, indeed, are work ing valiantly in this field; Prof. Miinsterberg

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has, for example, in his very interesting " On the Witness Stand," sought to popularize the psychology of testimony. But, for the profession, Mr. Moore has the inestimable advantage that his psychology is not only that of James but also of the judges. In forensic practice, especially as an aid to cross examination, no psychologist can compare with the keenly alert, deeply interested, and thoroughly trained observers who sit, with or without a jury, for the trial of facts. The comments of these skilled watchers, practically for the first time and with exceptional fullness, Mr. Moore has placed before us. The ability to look at facts through the eyes and brain of a skillful trial judge is a privilege which any practitioner well may prize, and which a young one sorely needs. Such are certain of the more leading rea sons for feeling that " Moore on Facts " is to fill a permanent need, and, as we have ven tured to predict, to become a classic. CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE. HIGHWAYS. "Dedication and Vacation of Streets and Highways in Illinois," by Otto G. Ryden, Illinois Law Review (V. iii, p. 218). HISTORY. " Select Essays in Anglo-Ameri can Legal History " by various authors, com piled and edited by a committee of the Asso ciation of American Law Schools, V. ii, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1908. This reprint bears the same evidence of careful selection that marked the first volume, but since classified under particular topics lacks the impression of unity that gave. -It deals with Sources, The Courts, their Organi zation and Jurisdiction, Procedure and Equity. The authors are various, beginning with a translation of an essay by the dis tinguished German historian of our law, Heinrich Brunner, revised by him especially for this purpose. The collection will do good service in educating us in the history of our law. INJUNCTIONS. " Proper Use of the Writ of Injunction — From the Standpoint of Legal History," by Frederick W. Stevens, Columbia Law Review (V. viii, p. 561). A short historical sketch of the writ of injunc tion leads to the following conclusions: "Unless statutes have prescribed other