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THE GREEN BAG

not move until the direct loss is ascertained be tween parties over whom he has no control and in proceedings in which he cannot intervene. According to the true construction of the policy sued upon the condition in question is not to be regarded as applying to the contract of reinsur ance. To hold otherwise would be to adhere to the letter, without paying due attention to the spirit and intention, of the contract. The ques tion does not seem to have been raised before this in Canada. In the United States, though, the point has not been brought before the Su preme Court, the universally accepted doctrine appears to be that a clause such as that in ques tion in this case is not applicable to a reinsurance policy. The appeal was therefore allowed. The policy of insurance in this case was in the reg ular New York Standard form with the ordinary re insurance rider attached, so that it is of practical as well as academic interest in this country. There is very little authority upon the point here involved, but the few text writers and decisions that have considered the point are in accord with the principal case. Joyce, section 126 : Clement, vol. i, page 338; Cooley, vol. iv. page 3696; Faneuil Hall Insurance Company v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company, 153 Mass. 69, 10 L. R. A. 482; Jackson v. St. Paul F. & M. Company, 99 N. Y. 124; Alker v. Rhoads, 73 App. Div. (N. Y.) 158. F. T. C.

INSURANCE. (Marine) Eng. English Com mercial Court. — Maritime Insurance Co. v. Alianza Insurance Co., 1907, 2 K. B., 660. By a policy of marine insurance for £ 1,000 at 6 per cent and a second policy of even date for £500 at a premium of 7 per cent, the Plaintiffs insured the Dum friesshire, valued at £7,000, against perils of the sea and other usual perils at and from a port in New Zealand to Nehoue, New Caledonia, and while there, and thence to Grangemouth. By a subsequent policy of reinsurance for £500 at a premium of 6/8d. per cent, the defendants rein sured the plaintiffs in the following terms: " at and from July ist, 1904, until August 3ist, 1904, both days inclusive, or as original, whilst at port or ports, place or places in New Caledonia, . . . being a reinsurance applying to policy . . . effected with the Maritime Insurance Company subject to the same clauses and conditions and to pay as may be paid thereon." These terms were accompanied by certain marginal voyage clauses in print, and a written clause " risk to commence same time as original," and the policy itself was in the printed form of a voyage policy. On July 3, 1904, the Dumfriesshire while en route for Nehoue was making for Gazelle Passage. After reaching Gazelle Passage, which is in New

Caledonia, and while passing through it, she struck on a reef, and certain general and particular average losses were incurred. The plaintiffs paid their proportion of such losses under their policies, and now sued the defendants on the reinsuring policy. Mr. Justice Walton gave judgment for the defendants, holding that the words " port or ports " and " place or places," mean place or places at which the vessel arrives in the course of her voyage for the purpose of loading, discharg ing, coaling, repairing or even taking shelter, or to which she has come for some purpose and with some object other than that of merely passing through without stopping at some other point. In his opinion the place where the loss occurred was not a place in New Caledonia within the meaning of the policy. INSURANCE.

(Suicide by Insured.)

Mass. —

As to whether recovery may be had under an in surance policy for death by suicide is an ever re curring question. One of the recent decisions in which it is involved is that of Davis v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 81 N. E. Rep. 294. An attempt was made in this case to draw a distinction between the rights of a beneficiary and those of the personal representatives of insured. It was claimed that whatever might be the rights of an executor or administrator, the insured could not deprive the beneficiary of his rights by misconduct subsequent to the taking out of the insurance cer tificate. The court could not be led to see matters in that light and denied recovery saying that the original contract impliedly excepted suicide as a cause of loss notwithstanding no mention of it was made in the certificate. LANDLORD AND TENANT. (Trespass by CoTenant.) Me. — Interesting questions as to the rights and liabilities of co-tenants toward each other are discussed in Davis v. Poland, 66 Atl. Rep. 380. Plaintiff was in the possession and occu pancy of certain premises in which the evidence showed that she was owner of a two-third interest, defendant owning the other third interest. De fendant entered on the property and removed doors and windows with the apparent object of making the house uninhabitable. Plaintiff re mained in possession at considerable discomfort and brought trespass against her co-tenant. While recognizing the general rule that one cannot sue his co-tenant for trespass on the common prop erty, the court says there are exceptions and comes to the conclusion that one of these is found in the present case. Plaintiff was allowed to re cover to the extent of two-thirds the value of the property removed and two-thirds of any other damage to the house, and whatever other damages