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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES ing a committee of his person and property. In 1900 he escaped from custody and went to Vir ginia, where he has since resided. In 1901, upon application made to a county court of the latter state, he was adjudged sane and capable of managing his affairs. In 1904 he instituted an action to which the present proceedings are ancillary, averring his sanity, setting up the decree of the Virginia court, and demanding damages from his committee in New York for conversion of his property. Defendant in the main action set up the decree of the New York court and alleged also that the petitioner was in fact insane and that the judgment of the Virginia court was collusive and void. Petitioner alleged that it was necessary that he should be present in New York at the time of trial of the main action, but that if he should go there he would be in immediate danger of reincarceration in the asylum, notwithstanding the Virginia decree. He there fore asked an order protecting him while in atten dance at trial and for reasonable time to return. It was claimed that interference on the part of the Federal Court would practically amount to enjoining proceedings in the state court. To this it was replied that the order of the state court for committment of petitioner had been complied with, and that any further incarceration would be accomplished by action of hospital attendants or police officers; that the only other proceedings in New York were those in which the committee was appointed, and that they would in no wise be stayed by a protective order, because their object was not to commit petitioner to the asylum, as he was already there at the time the proceed ings were instituted. The court referred to the peculiar predicament in which petitioner was placed and that unless relief were granted he must either abandon his action for a quarter of a million dollars or run the risk of losing his liberty. The Circuit Court was instructed to issue a writ of protection prohibiting apprehen sion of petitioner during the time necessary for him to be in New York in connection with his trial on condition that he should submit himself to the custody of one or more United States marshals during his stay and pay the expense of their employment. The order was also con ditioned on the issues of the case remaining as above indicated and should not be -operative if they should so be changed as to avoid the necessity of petitioner's presence at the trial of his main action. PRIVACY. (Restraining Publication of Photo graph.) If. Y. Sup. Ct. — Jn 1903 a statute went into force in New York prohibiting the use for advertising purposes, of the portrait or picture

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of any living person without first having obtained his written consent, or if the person whose picture was desired to be used should be a minor, the consent of the parent or guardian. The construc tion of this statute occupies the attention of the New York Supreme Court at Special Term in Wyatt v. Wanamaker, no New York Supple ment, 900. Plaintiff alleged minority and that defendant had been using her name and portrait for several weeks without the consent of herself or guardian and asked for damages and an injunc tion. Defendant, in addition to a general denial, alleged on information and belief that the original of the picture had been taken by a photographer in consideration of a reduction in price under an agreement that he should have the right to sell or otherwise use copies of the picture, and a custom among photographers to furnish photo graphs at what are known as " professional rates " to actors, actresses, etc., with right of publication, and that the original photograph in question was obtained by plaintiff under repre sentations that she was known to the public as a professional. The court held those defenses insufficient, saying private parties could not thus evade the plain provisions of the statute requiring written permission from the parent or guardian of a minor. PROPERTY. (Church Funds.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — Among the questions arising as a result of the Spanish American War there were, perhaps, few more difficult of solution than that involving the property rights of the Catholic Church. The Municipality of Ponce, in Porto Rico, laid claim to a church edifice, claiming that it was constructed with municipal funds and that there was no showing that the church had any existence as a corporate entity so as to enable it to hold prop erty. Both contentions were decided in favor of the church by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the municipality appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Its decision is reported in 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737, under the title Munici pality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico affirmed. It was held that whereever the funds for construction of the building came from, they were irrevocably donated to the church and the gift could not be annulled; that the church had, for centuries, been recog nized as a legal entity; that its rights as such had been acknowledged in the treaty of Paris and in concordats between Spain and the papacy and could not be denied at this late a date. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. (Enforcement of Oral Contract to Convey Land.) Kan. — In Bichel v. Oliver, 93 Pac. Rep. 396, it appeared