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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES by taking oath and giving bond. On the sth of November, 1907, Judge Jones came from his home in the Middle District of Alabama into the Northern District and had an order entered removing petitioner from his office as referee. This order of removal was made in the absence of petitioner and without notice to him or to Judge Hundley, Judge Jones claiming that he was a Judge for the Northern District, having equal authority with Judge Hundley; that where there is more than one district judge in a district the majority constitute the court and that in matters of appointment of permanent officers one judge cannot act without the consent of the other. On the matter being brought to the attention of Judge Hundley by petitioner Steele, he issued an order vacating the order of Judge Jones and holding that it had been improperly granted without warrant of law; that a bank ruptcy court is not migratory and that so long as he was the only judge holding court in the district he alone had authority to make the appointment. Under date of May 30, 1908, an order was made by Judge Jones, who was then not within the Northern District, appointing one Alexander Birch as referee and directing a division of the cases be tween Birch and Steele. A couple of days later Judge Jones came into the Northern District for a few hours and there issued an order ratifying the former one without consultation with Judge Hundley. Petitioner attacked this order on the ground that it was made without authority and that |it deprived him of certain emoluments to which he was entitled under his appointment by Judge Hundley. Judge Hundley discusses these later orders in the case reported in 161 Fed. Rep. 886, and again asserts his right to exer cise jurisdiction in the Northern District untrammeled by the action of Judge Jones, and directs the revocation of the appointment of Birch. EQUITY. (Jurisdiction—Specific Performance.) Mass. — The jurisdiction of a court of equity to [specifically enforce a compromise agreement between heirs [is considered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Blount v. Dillaway, 85 N. E. Rep. 477. Plaintiff's mother left a will by. which practically the entire estate was given to the brother of plaintiff, the two being the only heirs. On being informed of this fact by her brother, plaintiff entered into an agreement with him by which she was to receive one-third of the estate in consideration of not contesting the will. The will was duly probated and no contest made. Subsequently the brother indicated an intention not to be bound by the compromise agreement. Plaintiff then asked the aid of a court of equity for specific performance

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as against the executor and to compel him to pay over the one-third interest. The statute of Massachusetts gives to a will contestant a stand ing in the probate court to enforce compromise agreements. This was held, however, not to prevent equity taking jurisdiction under the cir cumstances disclosed in the present case. EVIDENCE. (Admissibility of Telephonic Conversation.) Minn. — The subject of the ad mission in evidence of a conversation over tele phone is discussed in Barrett v. Magner, 117 N. W. Rep. 245. A witness testified that he secured telephone connection with the place of business of a party; that some one answered and stated the person wanted was not in, but would be called, and that soon thereafter another voice answered and a conversation took place respect ing a business transaction. The conversation was admitted in evidence in view of the fact that the witness further stated that the talk over the telephone was of the same character as occurred a few days previous in a personal conversation between the same parties. The decision in this case seems thoroughly sound. The fact that Zimmerman, the person asked for, apparently came to the telephone and held the conversation seems sufficient by itself to identify him. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2155. The chances of Zimmerman being impersonated are too slight to be regarded when the need of being able to prove such conversations is considered. It seems unfortunate therefore that the court should have expressed the opinion, quite unneces sarily, that the above fact alone would be insuf ficient. The distinction suggested by the court between calling up an office and calling up an individual seems unsound. The nature of the evidence of identity is the same in both cases. The danger of an impostor replying seems prac tically as great in the office case as in the individual case. Indeed Wigmore (Evidence, § 2155 (c)) expresses the opinion that the office case contains the greater danger. But, disregarding the dicta of the court, the decision is clearly sound in con sidering the evidence of the prior similar conversa tion sufficiently corroborative. C. B. W. EXTRADITION. (Sufficiency of Accusation.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The Constitution of the United States provides for extradition of persons accused of " treason, felony, or other crime." This clause is construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pierce v. Creecy, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 714, a habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of H. Clay Pierce, president of the Waters-Pierce