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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES Supreme Court of Michigan to constitute con tempt of court under the circumstances of the case in In Re McHugh el ad., 116 N. W. Rep. 459. Defendants were employed for the defense in a murder trial and on denial of an application for postponement were told that the case must be tried at that term and that they must be ready to proceed at a day mentioned less than a week later. Neither of them at first appeared on that day, but subsequently one of them came and argued a motion for continuance, which was denied, though they were allowed three days more time. Instead of appearing in court at the latter date set for trial, defendants went to Canada. An order was then issued for their arrest for con tempt. A few days later they voluntarily appeared in court and offered testimony to explain their absence. The trial court held their excuse insufficient and imposed a fine of $250 on each with an additional punishment of 30 days in jail for one of them. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. This case is clearly right on principle and is in accord with the decided weight of authority, much of which is referred to by the court in its decision. The principle is similar to that which underlies the power of a court to punish sum marily for certain classes of contempts, the fact that the act so dealt with may also be a crime and punishable as such, being immaterial. (2 Bish. New Cr. L. J 241). The power to preserve the orderly administration of the law and the power to see that officers of the court so inti mately associated with the administration of the law as are attorneys, are properly qualified, morally and otherwise, for the exercise of their duties, are inherent in the courts. A statute would have to be extremely clear to vest in another department of government the right to affect the exercise of such necessary and salutary control. H. A. B. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. (Pardon of Attor ney — Effect on Disbarment.) Ky. — M. C. Nelson, an attorney practicing in the Kentucky courts. was indicted for forgery and plead guilty. Very shortly thereafter he was pardoned by the governor. On filing his pardon in court he was ordered released from custody, but at the same time was cited to appear and show cause why he should not be disbarred. He then refiled the pardon, claiming to be absolved thereby from all results of his conviction. The trial court held the pardom no defense, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The decision of that tribunal affirming the judgment of the lower court is reported in 109 S. W. Rep. 337, under the title Nelson v. Commonwealth. The court said that honesty and good character being requisites to

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the right to practice law were not restored by pardon, and as the court had power independently of statute to disbar attorneys practicing therein, the disbarment was not conditioned on conviction of crime and was not affected by the pardon. Several other disbarment cases and decisions involving the effect of pardons are cited in the opinion of the court. CARRIERS. (Injuries to Passenger — Res Ipsa Loquitur.) Utah. —-The meaning and applica tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is rather puzzling at times. It is discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Paul v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 95 Pac. Rep. 363. in connection with an action for injuries to a passenger alighting from a street car. Counsel for plaintiff contended that under the doctrine referred to all that was necessary to prove in order to make out a prima facie case were the facts that plaintiff was a passenger and that she was injured while alighting. The court declined to go that far. but said that if it were proved that she was injured by the moving of the car while alighting, the presumption would arise that the movement was due to the negligence of the company. The general rule is stated to be as follows: " To show merely that an accident occurred and that an injury was sustained by a passenger is not enough. It must further be made to appear that the injury was caused by something which, at the time it occurred, was in the care, custody, or under control of the carrier, or in some way connected with or related to his business in the transportation of passengers. A former opinion in the same case reported in 83 Pac. Rep. 563,* and the cases of Dearden v. S. P., L. A. & S. L. R. Co. (Utah), 93 Pac. 271, and Price v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 75 Ark. 491, 88 S. W. 578. 112 Am. St. Rep. 79, are cited as upholding the doctrine as above enunciated. The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur has been the subject of much contention, and has been widely discussed by the Massachusetts Court. The lan guage in Feital v''. Middlesex Railroad Company, 109 Mass. 398, seems to be the basis of the later opinions, and we find the doctrine gradually developed in the following cases: Graham v. Badger, 164 Mass. 42. 41 N. E. 61. Harriman v. Reading, etc., Ry. Co., 173 Mass. 78. 53 N. E. 156. Buckland v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 181 Mass. 3. 62 N. E. 955. Savage v. Marlboro' St. Ry. Co., 186 Mass. 203. 71 N. E. 531. Hebblethwaite v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 192 Mass. 295. Magee v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 195 Mass. in. Minihan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 197 Mass. 367.