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 THE LAW SCHOOLS AND THE COURTS the classical period, so called, a Roman lawsuit was divided into two stages. The first was before the praetor, a magistrate with official power, who settled the terms of the formula. The second was before the judex, a mere private citizen who need not be a lawyer and usually was not, and whose sole duty it was to decide the questions of fact referred to him by the formula, and acquit or condemn according to his instruc tions.1 It is manifest that our system requires on the part of the judges wide knowledge of facts and of life and insight in dealing with them in order to do their work well. If a judge is trying a case without a jury, and the issue is upon the sudden automatic starting of a loom or a printing press or a steam engine, some knowledge of machin ery will be useful in enabling him to under stand the evidence and reach a true finding. If he is trying the case with a jury, such knowledge will aid him in ruling upon the evidence offered and in instructing the jury, if fortunately he is in a state where the presiding judge retains his common law powers in the trial. The practical result to the parties in every case, the justice or injustice of the result reached by the court, will depend quite as much upon the intelli gence and judgment used by the court in disposing of the questions of fact as upon the application of the rules of law. This is true also of courts of last resort. Indeed, in the highest courts.where the law is stated with binding authority, a large knowledge of facts on the part of the judges is even more important than in the trial courts. Appellate courts do not determine the truth of facts, except in special cases. A large part of their labor, however, must be devoted to ascertaining from the record what are the concrete facts in each case, and deciding upon the legal value of facts, as to whether they do or do not affect the rights of the parties. A distinguished 1 Sohm's Institutes (Ledlie's trans.), 148-152.

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French writer says, "We commonly use the expression, Force of law. The law obtains that force only by its perfect adaptation to the needs of the society which it governs."1 From the nature of their work and the requirements of their office, judges are to some extent shut off from contact with business life, and are in danger of falling into error from that cause. They are also exposed to criticism upon that side of their work. For example, so candid and able a writer as John Stuart Mill, in speaking of the action of juries in certain cases, said, "While the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead them."3 In all that important part of their work which relates to facts the judges are especially in need of aid, and their principal aid must come from the bar. What can the law school do to teach a student how to master the facts of a case and the evidence? Quickness of perception would be a highly useful quality for that work, but the law school cannot teach quickness of perception. Early training has much influence in the making of a lawyer. Life in the public schools, work on a farm, or on board ship, or in a factory or counting room, in short, every kind of experience which brings one in close contact with men is useful in giving that quickness and accuracy of perception and knowledge of human nature required to deal effectively and powerfully with facts. It has been fine ly said that "the sparks of all the sciences in the world are taken up in the ashes of the law."' The best fruit of a lawyer's entire education and experience, the result to which all his education and experience contribute, is that quality which is sum1 M. Albert Sorel, in Le Code Civil, Livre du Centenaire. Vol. I, Introduction, p. xxv. 2 Essay on Liberty, London, 1859, p. 123. note. 3 Lord Nottingham. Cited by Mr. Alfred Hememvay, Annual Address (1905). 28 A. B. A. R. 394.