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THE GREEN BAG

on a directed verdict for defendant was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. NEGLIGENCE. (Turntable Doctrine.) W. Va. — The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir ginia in Conrad v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 61 S. E. Rep. 44, joins in following the lead of the recently noted cases from Ohio and Pennsylvania against the doctrine of the " turntable cases " as first announced in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745. Willie Conrad, a boy twelve years old, was injured while playing at turn table located in a thickly settled portion of a small town. Judgment was recovered in the lower court for his injuries and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals refers to the statement sometimes made that turntables are "attractive nuisances " as unjustifiable and says: "A turn table is a useful and lawful machine affixed to the owner's real estate, and incapable of doing any manner of harm to any person off of the land. It is immobile, not unsightly, not obstructive, not offensive in any sense. Nobody can be injured by it unless he come upon the land and set the machine in motion himself, to his own injury." A distinction is drawn between turn table and spring gun and trap cases and the judgment of the lower court reversed. While not a turntable case, a very similar principle is involved in Martin v. Louisville and J. Bridge Co., 84 N. E. Rep. 360, decided by the Appellete Court of Indiana. In this case an attempt was made to recover for injuries received by falling into an unguarded excavation across a path which had been habitually used by the public for a considerable time prior thereto. The court maintains the doctrine that an owner of property is under a duty to protect anyone coming thereon by invitation but that "mere passive acquies cence in the use of lands by others is not sufficient to make the appellees liable for injuries received by appellant under the facts alleged." TAXATION. (Policy Loans by Insurance Com panies.) U. S. C. C. La. — Whether so called "policy loans " by insurance companies consti tute "taxable credits" was recently decided. An interesting statement is given as to the method pursued in making these loans and the provisions for their repayment. The court says that they really constitute part payments of debts before maturity and that the term " policy loan " is a misnomer. The conclusion is reached that they do not constitute credits of the company and that they are therefore not taxable. The title of the case is New York Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors. It is reported in 158 Fed. Rep. 462.

TORTS. (Unfair Competition.) U. S. C. C. Ill. In Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Company, 161 Fed. Rep. 219, the question of the right of a trading stamp company to restrain inter ference with its business was passed upon. The company asking the injunction had em barked in a business in which they made con tracts with merchants whereby they furnished green trading stamps to be given to customers on making purchases for cash. These stamps were to be kept in a book by the recipient and when he had a certain number they were redeem able in merchandise of the stamp company. By the terms of the agreement the stamps were not transferable and the title to the same remained in the stamp company, only the right to redeem being transferred by the merchant to his cus tomers. The defendant company sought to interfere with this business by buying up the stamp books from the holders thereof and giving them in return their own stamps. The first company had expended considerable money and effort in advertising the wares of the merchants who used its stamps. The court held, in an opinion by Judge Kohlsaat, that the interference with the business was unlawful and should be restrained. TRUSTS. (Deposit of Public Officer.) Okl. — In the case of Watts v. Board of Com'rs of Cleve land County, 95 Pac. Rep. 771, the question before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was the right of a county to recover funds deposited by its treas urer in a bank which had subsequently to the time of the deposit become insolvent and gone into the hands of a receiver. The treasurer of Cleveland County prior to the passage of any law providing for the designation of county depositories deposited funds of the county in a bank in his name as treasurer. Sub sequently and before the funds were withdrawn the bank became insolvent and a receiver was appointed. The question then arose as to the rights of the county in the funds in the hands of the receiver. The court held, in an opinion by Judge Kane, that the money belonging to the county and deposited by its treasurer in the bank constituted a trust fund which the county might follow into the nands of the receiver after its failure; that the title to the money deposited did not pass to the bank so as to establish the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the county, as is the case with the ordinary deposit, although there was no agreement that the identical money should be returned to the treasurer and that hence the county was entitled to recover an equal amount from the receiver of the bank prior to the payment of the general depositors.