Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 20.pdf/494

 NOTES OF RECENT CASES MARRIAGE. (Common Law Marriage.) N. Y. Sup. Ct. — Questions as to legitimacy and inheri tance as dependent on common law marriages are continually coming up in one form or other. In Geiger v. Ryan, 108 New York Supplement 13, it appeared that defendant celebrated a civil and an ecclesiastical marriage with the mother of plaintiff who was the daughter of a man with whom her mother had been cohabiting before her marriage to defendant. The mother out lived, by several years, the father of plaintiff, and after her marriage to defendant and up to the time of her death, cohabited with him. The court held that while a presumption of a valid marriage with the father of plaintiff might be presumed so as to legitimize plaintiff and possibly invalidate the ceremonial marriage with defen dant, the continued cohabitation with defendant after death of plaintiff's father would establish a valid common law marriage with defendant. NAVIGABLE WATERS. (Obstruction by Log ging Operations.) Me. — Owners of summer cot tages are held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Smart v. Aroostock Lumber Co., 68 Atl. Rep. 527, to a right of passage on a small navigable stream as against a logging company which had obstructed it for several miles with logs floated down to its mills. The defendant claimed that it had monopolized the commercial business on the stream and that consequently no one was injured, but the court held that plaintiff was entitled to its use for access to his summer cottage and that navigation for the purpose of mere pleasure is as much within the protection of the law as is a use for commercial purposes. NEGLIGENCE. (Proximate Cause.) Mass. — In " Sullivan w. Old Colony Street Ry. Co." 83 N. E. Rep. 1091, it was claimed that the premature birth of a child, conceived several months after an injury to the mother, could not be charged to be the result of such injury as there must have been an intervening efficient cause by voluntary act. The court could not be persuaded to take that view but said " The perpetuation of the human race cannot be termed a voluntary act but it rests upon instincts and desires which are funda mentally imperative." POST OFFICE. (Delivery of Mail.) U. S. Sup. Ct. —- In the case entitled National Life Insurance Company of the United States of America v. National Life Insurance Company, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 541, the Supreme Court of the United States is asked to determine as to which of the parties mail matter addressed " National Life Insurance Company, Chicago, Ill.," without any designa tion of street or number or any other distinction should be delivered. It seemed that the com

plainant was chartered by act of Congress in 1868, while defendant was incorporated under the law of Vermont in 1848 under the name " National Life Insurance Company of the United States," which was changed in 1858 to its present name "National Life Insurance Company." It was admitted to do business in Illinois in 1860, and has continuously done business in that state since that time. Considerable mail matter has all along been received at the Chicago Post Office addressed simply " National Life Insurance Company " part of which was shown to belong to one of the parties to this suit and part to the other. There had been considerable discussion as to which one of these companies this matter should be delivered but the post office department finally issued an order that it should all be turned over to the defendant in view of the fact that the address corresponded with its name and it was first organized. The present action was to enjoin the carrying out of this order but the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the ruling of the postal authorities. PROCEDURE. (Limitation of Actions.) Miss. —• The application of the statute of limitations to recovery by heirs, of land sold to pay the debts of the estate, comes up in a peculiar way in Jordan v. Bobbitt, 45 So. Rep. 311. The owner through whom all parties claimed as a common source of title died in 1861. A few years later the widow conveyed her dower interest to a remote grantor of defendant who subsequently also purchased it at sale under order of court for payment of debts of the estate. After the death of the widow some thirty years later, the heirs brought action for recovery of the land claiming that the admin istrator's sale was invalid and as the purchaser was then in rightful possession under conveyance of the life interest of the widow they had no right of action to recover it until after her death and could only be barred by the ten years statute of limitation then in force and not by the one year statute in force at the time of sale. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the one year statute applied notwithstanding it had been repealed before the suit was commenced; that it began to run on the death of the widow and as the action was not begun within that time it was barred. Judge Whitfield dissents most emphatically from the majority of the court and characterizes the decision as one which leaves no rights to remainder men and reversioners. PROPERTY. (Party Walls.) Mass. — Where a party wall has been built by an adjoining land owner under agreement with his neighbor that reimbursement shall be made for one half the cost of the part he may subsequently use, will the