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THE GREEN BAG

CIVIL SERVICE. (Solicitation of Campaign Funds.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The federal statute prohibiting the solicitation of campaign funds in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by certain officer or employes of the United States is construed in United States v. Thayer, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426, to include the mailing of letters to be delivered in such buildings to civil service employes employed therein. The court discusses the question as to what constitutes a solicitation and holds that it may be done as well by writing as by word of mouth and that the act is not complete until delivery of the letter. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Commerce.) Mont. — The legislature of Montana, in 1907, passed a law restricting the hours of labor by engineers and other employes of carriers operating in that statf, to not more than sixteen hours in any twentyfour hour period. In the case of State v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 93 Pac. Rep. 945, defendant, charged with violation of this statute, defended on the ground that it was unconstitutional as an interference with interstate commerce. The court held that it was a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, unless conflicting with some act of 'congress on the same subject. The claim was then made that congress had legislated on that very proposition by an act which was to go into effect March 4, 1908, but the court held that the law passed by the legislature could not in any way conflict with that enacted by congress, until the actual time of taking effect of the later statute* notwithstanding it was enacted several months before the decision was rendered. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Indeterminate Sen tence.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The validity of the inde terminate sentence act of Michigan is called in question in Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372. Plaintiff in error was convicted of burglary and sentenced by one of the Michigan courts to a term of imprisonment in the peniten tiary for a period not less than one year nor more than two years. Upon the expiration of the minimum period he applied for parole, but was informed that his application cpuld not be con sidered on account of the fact that the records showed that he had been twice before convicted of felony. After expiration of the full two years of the sentence, being still detained in prison, he instituted habeas corpus proceedings to obtain his release, but his application was denied by the Supreme Court of Michigan. The case in the Supreme Court of the United States was on appeal from this decision. Under the provisions of the indeterminate sentence law that part of the sen tence fixing the maximum punishment was void because the maximum penalty was fixed by the statute itself. Plaintiff in error contended that

the law was invalid because it denied to prisoners of the class to which he belonged the right to apply for parole given to those who had not been previ ously convicted of any crime, but the Supreme Court held that the giving of such right was a mere question of privilege which might be extended or withheld as the legislature saw fit. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Penalties — Courts.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — Questions of vast importance as to hew far a state may go in the fixing of railroad rates are discussed in the case of Ex parts Young. 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441. In 1907 the legislature of Minnesota passed a law restricting passenger rates to two cents per mile, and another statute fixing the charges for transportation of certain commodi ties. Penalties consisting of very large fines, and in some instances imprisonment, were prescribed for violation of these laws. The railroads alleged that the restrictions on rates would so materially reduce their income as to amount to a taking of their property without due process of law, and that on the other hand if they attempted to operate under the old rates, they and their employes would be subjected to such enormous penalties as to practically force them to suspend business. The- court said, " Now, to impose upon a party interested, the burden of obtaining a judi cial decision of such a question (no prior hearing having been given) only upon condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines, as provided in these acts is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts and thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low and therefore invalid." It was therefore held that on account of these provisions the laws were invalid without regard to the question whether the rates prescribed were too low. There are some difficulties in the course of this decision but its substantial justice can hardly be questioned. It is rather remarkable that the matter had not been settled long before. As a matter of truth such pains and penalties may really close up all access to the courts. The recognition of the inherent wrong in this is as oid as Magna Cham itself. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Primary Election Law.) H. D. — The provision of the North Dakota primary election law assessing certain fees on can didates as a condition to placing their names on the primary ballot was attacked on various grounds in case of Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N. W. Rep. 1071, and held invalid. It was said for one thing that in case a man whom the people were seeking to place in office was either unwilling or unable to pay the fee, the only way in which