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THE GREEN BAG

the fact that they were trustees. The point at issue was really whether the legis latures of the states may deal with trustees who are incorporated as if there were nothing involved but the charter of incor poration. The arguments played around this point, but stress was laid rather upon the kind of corporation than upon the kind of property involved. Let us glance at that property aspect of the case. There was a time, not so many centuries ago in England, when statutes were found necessary to enable a man to dispose of his property by will. There was also 'a time when the Court of Chancery first undertook to protect property in trust, and to see that it was applied accord ing to the intentions of the donors. The confidence of a testator that his plans in regard fb the uses to which his property is to be applied after his death, and the con fidence of any creator of, or donor to, a trust that the declared purposes of the trust will be adhered to, rest upon a belief in the stability of the law, and, especially, upon a belief that the people will continue to regard the right of persons to deal with their own property in their own way, provided they injure not others, as sacred. Suppose I choose to devote my property to educational purposes, and open a school. My school being well patronized, I decide to enlarge my enterprise, and I take in a partner, and finally, the business still increasing, I apply, with others, for a charter of incorporation. It is evident that a business corporation of this sort would be subject to the general laws of the state, and that it would be protected from any legislation which would not affect all similar corporations which might exist in the state. Such a corporation, although mere business interests are involved, is never interfered with, except where it has become insolvent, and the rights or creditors demand that it should be wound up, so long as the corpo ration conforms to the general laws and to its charter.

Suppose, now, a number of wealthy persons should endow a charity, and the trustees of the charity should be incorpor ated. Would their incorporation destroy their character as trustees, and give the legislature power to dictate in regard to the purpose for which they Were originally made trustees? It was argued, and afterwards made much of, in the College case, that abuses might creep in which might not be such distinct violations of the trust as to enable the courts to apply a remedy. But, under neath this argument, lay the suppressed premise, that education, being an important public interest, should be the object of the legislature's particular care. It was for gotten, or ignored, that the legislature was not restrained from promoting that object merely because the Trustees, in pursuance of the purposes of the trust, were promoting the same object. Again, a group of men may have formed a trust for the purpose of promoting the planting of trees, and may have definitely fixed the method which they have decided to follow in carrying out their design. A charter of incorpqration may have been obtained by them. After they have carried on the work for some years, one of them, dissatisfied with the method of procedure laid down, goes to the legislature, to get it to modify the charter to suit his own ideas. By political influence, by "pull," in other words, he succeeds in having an act passed that accomplishes his purpose, or would do so, if it could be upheld by the courts. This is no idle supposition, but exactly corresponds to what happened in the College case. The President of the College fell out with the trustees, was dismissed from his office, and determined to get even with them. He took his grievance to the legis lature, and secured following enough to get the questionable acts passed. Seventy-five out of one hundred and ninety members of the House protested against the first, and principal, act, and their protest was entered upon the journal of the House. The protest