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for any office, but he has always kept up a lively interest in public affairs, both local and national. This is well illustrated by the case of the state, on the relation of the attorney-general, v. Hobart et al., which was an action commenced by the attorneygeneral of Ohio to secure an injunction against the holding in Cincinnati of an exhibition which it was alleged would be a prize fight, on the ground that it would constitute a public nuisance. The case excited a great deal of public interest and feeling, a large part of the community being of the .opinion that such exhibitions were improper and immoral, — while the con trary was held by a considerable minority. Those who were opposed to the exhibition induced the attorney-general to commence proceedings to secure an injunction, and sundry leaders of the bar, among whom was Judge Harmon, volunteered to prosecute the action. It was heard in the Court of Com mon Pleas, of Hamilton County, and hotly contested. The defendants strenuously insisted that it was not a case for a court of equity. Judge Harmon made a powerful and elaborate argument, largely devoted to the proposition that equitable remedies are not exclusively devoted to rights of property, but may in exceptional cases extend to the protection of public interests; and succeeded in obtaining an injunction against the proposed exhibition. An incident in the career of Judge Harmon since his retirement • from office which attracted a great deal of public attention at the time, occurred when he was retained in connection with Mr. Frederick N. Judson of St. Louis by Attorney-General Moody, at the direction of the President, to examine and report to the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the matter of unlawful rates and practices in the transportation of coal and mining supplies by The Atehison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company. The case was pending at the time that he was retained and a decree had already been entered against the Railway Company,

forbidding them from acting under or enforcing or executing in any manner any agreement to transport over its railroad any interstate traffic at other than the schedule rates. Upon investigation of the facts of which evidence had been taken, the special counsel found and reported that the Railway Com pany, its officers and agents, had been guilty of contempt in a great many instances, and that an immense quantity of coal and other things had been shipped over its road in violation of the order of injunction. They recommended that proceedings in contempt be taken against the Railway Company and its officers, saying: " The abolition of imprisonment by the Elkins law does not apply to contempts, so that this penalty as well as a fine may be imposed, if in the judgment of the court a case for such punishment be made out against any officer. At the same time, the court has a much broader discretion than it would have in a strictly criminal proceeding to adapt its punishment to the degree of guilt in the case of each defendant." "Upon this report a correspondence en sued between the special counsel and the attorney -general, in which it was evident that the latter preferred that proceedings should be taken against the Railway Com pany, but was not willing, as the case then stood, to commence proceedings against individuals. Messrs. Harmon and Judson insisted upon the propriety of proceeding against the officers of the corporation, as well. as against the company itself, and in a letter dated April n, 1905, to the attorneygeneral they say: " It necessarily follows, therefore, that when there is proof of the violation of the court's order by a corporate defendant, some individuals are chargeable with the wrong and they are presumably the officers in charge of the corporate busi ness involved. We deem it of importance to the interests of the Government and as a judicial precedent that this principle of individual resoonsibility for corporate ac