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 JUDSON HARMON merce law, which was peculiarly applicable to railroads and rendered the so-called "Sherman " law inapplicable thereto: but the court negatived both of these conten tions and held with the government that the act did apply to a combination of rail road companies and that the association of defendants was in violation of its termsIn the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Peckham, after an elaborate discussion of the questions involved, says: "The con clusion which we have drawn from the examination above made in the question before us is that the anti-trust act applies to railroads and that it renders illegal all agreements which are in restraint of trade or commerce, as we have above denned that expression; and the question then arises whether the agreement before us is of that nature," which question he subsequently answers in the affirmative; so that the court by a majority of five justices, to four dissenting, reversed the judgments of the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Kansas, where the case originated, and which had been in favor of the association. This was the first of the great " Anti trust " cases, and it formed a large part of the foundation of the subsequent ones. The brief filed by Judge Harmon in that case was regarded as a very strong one, and has been in great demand, — so much so that several subsequent editions of it were pub lished and it is still difficult to obtain a copy. The case is reported in the 166 U. S. 290. The cases of the United States v. Freight Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, and Addyston Pipe Company v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, were commenced by Judge Harmon during his term of office as attorneygeneral, but were argued by his successor. On the 7th of January, 1896, the House of Representatives passed a resolution request ing Judge Harmon to report what steps, if any, he had taken to enforce the law of the United States against trusts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade and

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commerce, and what further legislation, if any, was needed, in his opinion, to protect the people against the same. For answer, he stated that two of the cases above men tioned were pending; and to that part of the resolution which invites suggestion as to further legislation to protect the people against trusts, combinations and conspira cies, he said : " I suggest an amendment that will leave no doubt as to what is meant by attempting to monopolize, and by contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce. It should not be difficult to distinguish legitimate enterprises carried on by individuals or by associations of individuals in bona fide partnerships and corporations, however great and successful they may become by superior capacity, facilities or enterprise, from combinations of rival concerns, no matter under what form of disguise, whose object is to stifle competition and thereby secure illicit control of the markets. The real nature and desire of the organization would always be a question of fact. Courts have no difficulty in deciding this question when it arises between the parties. They would have none in deciding it when it arises between the Government and the parties." He further says that the present law should contain a provision like that of the Interstate Commerce law, to prevent the refusal of witnesses to answer on the ground of self-incrimination; that this difficulty had been severely felt in all attempts to enforce the law. From all this it would seem that during his brief term of office Judge Harmon had done a great deal towards solving the questions raised by the huge combinations of trade and commerce which have grown up within the last few years, and which questions are of such complexity and difficulty as to tax the resources of our best equipped lawyers. Since the expiration of his term of office as attorney-general, Judge Harmon has persistently refused to become a candidate