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 ASSIGNABILITY OF POLICY Overhiser's Adm'r. v. Overhiser, 63 Ohio St. 77. Mowry v. Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346. This list might be almost indefinitely ex tended. At the opposite pole from the Kansas theory is the theory that a policy of insur ance is assignable as any other chose in action. The ground upon which this theory is based is that it enables one who can no longer pay the premiums on his policy to sell it or borrow money on it from others than the insurance company. Where poli cies may be forfeited for non-payment of • premiums, it is a hardship on the insured not to be able to assign his policy. And even where he may borrow from the insur ance company on the policy as security, the fact that he may not sell to any one else except those having an insurablc in terest in his life, who may have no money, gives to the company a monopoly and places the insured at a disadvantage. Nor is the danger to the company from an assign ment to one not having an insurable interest so great as it appears at' first blush. The insured is not likely to assign to one in whom he has not great confidence and the company in the majority of cases, assents to the assignment. They are therefore doubly protected. To allow an insurance company to refuse to pay anything to an assignee in cases where it has consented to the assignment, either expressly or by receiving premiums from him, looks very much like assisting, or at least countenanc ing, the perpetration of a fraud. This view was taken in St. John v. Ameri can Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31. The court used the following language: "It seems to me it cannot be doubted but that the assured might legally assign the policies 'to the plaintiff. It has been said that without the right to assign, insurances on lives lose half their usefulness. Policies of insurance are choses in action; they are governed by the same principles applicable to other agreements involving pecuniary obligations. So far as regards the question

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of the liability of the company, it is not material whether the plaintiff paid a full consideration upon such transfer or not. Such liability in no manner depends upon the amount of consideration of the assign ments. The assignments on their face show a sufficient consideration to render them valid in the hands of the assignee, as against the company. On the death of Mr. Noyes, if he died within the period limited by the policies, the company agreed to pay the amount of the insurance. It cannot be material, neither does it affect the liability of the company, whether the money is due and payable to the legal representatives of the assured or to his assignee." Substantially the same position was taken in A. O. U. W. 'v. Brown, 112 Ga. 545; Fitzpatrick v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116, though in this case the assignee was a distant relative of the assured; Valton v. Natl. Fund Life Ins. Co., 20 . Y. 32; Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593; Bond r. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210; Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Pa. 450. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, it. was held that "A policy of life insurance without restrictive words is assignable by 'the as sured for a valuable consideration equally with any other chose in action; where the assignment is not made to cover a mere speculative risk, and thus evade the law against wager policies; and payment thereof may be enforced for the benefit of the assignee and, under the system of procedure in many states, in his name." This decision is interesting as showing a tendency upon the Supreme Court of the United States to look with greater liberality upon assign ments than when it decided Cammack v. Lewis and Warnock v. Davis. The question of the validity of the assign ment arises more often between the assignee and the personal representatives of the in sured than between the assignee and the insurance company. Among the leading cases in which the courts have held tthat even against the personal representatives of