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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES PROPERTY. (Fixtures.) N. Y. Sup. Gt.— Defendant, in the case of Brunswick Construc tion Co. v. Burden, 101 N. Y. Supp. 716, sold his dwelling house to plaintiffs on condition that he might " remove all fixtures attached to said premises." He subsequently carried away man tels and hinges made to match the furniture, and parquet flooring laid over a permanent floor. Plaintiff sued for their recovery. The court said that they were not distinctively realty and re fused to grant any relief. It also held that the right of removal was not affected by failure to reserve it in the deed as there was an agreement to that effect in the contract of sale, an oral agreement of a similar character at the time the deed was made, and defendant was allowed. to remain in possession of the premises for some time thereafter. PROPERTY. (Homestead — Conveyance of by Husband to Wife.) Ill. — The strictness with which the courts construe statutes relating to conveyances of homesteads is illustrated by the decision in Smith v. Hollenbeck, 83 N. E. Rep. 206. It appeared that Henry Hollenbeck, through whom all the parties claimed title, executed a deed of his homestead to his wife without her joining in the conveyance and at the same time made a will by which, after making certain spe cific bequests, he devised the remainder of his property to defendant as residuary legatee. On the death of the wife, who survived her husband, a question arose as to the rights of the heirs in the homestead. The court decided that the convey ance by the husband without joinder by the wife was void so far as the homestead rights to the extent of one thousand dollars were concerned and that the fact of the will being made at the same time as the contract made no difference. STATUTES. (Sufficiency of Title.) Colo. Sup. Ct. — The constitution of Colorado Art. 5, § 21 provides that the subject matter of a statute must be expressed in its title and §253 requires the legislature to provide for an eight hour day for persons employed in certain employments that the legislature may consider injurious to health. The legislature in its " Women and Children Labor Act "-of 1903, Sess. Laws 1903, p. 310, c. 138; (3 Mills. Ann. St. Rev. Supp. p. 757) pro

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vided that no woman of 16 years of age or more be required to work for more than 8 hours a day in any mill, factory, manufacturing establish ment, shop or store where she is required to stand upon her feet in order to perform her labor. The act was entitled " An act to prescribe and regu late the hours of employment for women and children in mills, factories, manufacturing estab lishments, shops, stores and any other occupa tion which may be deemed unhealthful or danger ous. The Supreme Court of Colorado in Burcher et al. v. People, 93 Pac. 14 a prosecution under the above act for employing a woman above the age of 16 in a laundry for more than 8 hours per day, held that the title of the act was not broad enough to cover the provision prohibiting the employ ment of women for more than 8 hours a day in a mill, factory, etc., since the title relates to occu pations injurious to health and the provision treats of occupations which may not be un healthful. TAXATION. (Jurisdiction — Piers Extending Over the Water.) Md. —-A peculiar question as to the Municipal boundaries and the right to levy taxes as affected thereby is discussed by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Western Maryland T. R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 68 Atl. Rep. 6. A portion of the southern boundary of the City of Baltimore is declared to run with the main branch of the Patapsco River. Plaintiffs in error constructed piers extending out over the water from lots owned by them and they were assessed for taxes by the city. The evidence went to show that the main part and value of the piers was beyond the line of the city as originally established. It was contended on the one side that as they were attached to the land and would be useless without it they should be considered in the same light as accretions and as a part of the land to which they were attached. On the other hand that only the part built on the land could be taxed by the city and that the remaining por tion was under the jurisdiction of the county adjoining. The court speaks of the character of the structures, and the fact that they are depend ent on the city for fire and police protection and conies to the conclusion that they are properly taxable by the city to their entire extent.