Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 20.pdf/213

 THE GREEN BAG CARRIERS. (Stopping at Destination of Passenger.) N. J. Sup. Ct. — In Runyon v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 68 Atl. Rep., 107, it appeared that Runyon went to the ticket office of the company at its Broad Street Station in Philadelphia and inquired of the agent at what time he could get the next train through to Lower Jamesburg, and was informed that it left at 3.30. Receiving this information, he purchased a ticket for that station and after waiting for about ten minutes went to the gate and requested the gateman to directpiim to the 3.30 train, at the same time showing him his ticket and informing him that it was the train for Lower Jamesburg which he wanted. The gateman pointed out the train to him andjhe took his seat therein and proceeded on his journey. Before reaching the city of Trenton, he*was notified by the conductor of the train that it did not stop at Lower James burg and that he would have to get off at Trenton. This he refused to do and when the train reached Trenton he was removed from it against his will by the conductor and another employee of the company. The contention of the plaintiff was that the purchase of the ticket, together with the representation made by the agent, constituted a contract, obliging the company to stop its train at his destination. The court denied this con tention, holding that neither the agent's misrepre sentation or the purchase of the ticket constituted any contract obliging the company to stop, but that it became plaintiff's duty when informed that the train^did not stop at such station either to tender such fare as would entitle him to ride to some stopping point beyond or comply with the conductor's request. CARRIERS. (Tickets.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — While the railroads 'have been stubbornly fighting the enforcement of recent rate legislation in icveral states, they have also been seeking the protection of the courts against scalpers dealing in Jnon-transferable excursion tickets, and have apparently been victorious. In the case of Bitterman v. Louisville & N. Ry. Company, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 91, the United States |Supreme Court considers the question of the right to injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals|had directed the Circuit Court to enter a decree restraining defendant scalpers from dealing in certain classes of tickets previously issued and from carrying on the business of dealing in such tickets in the future. Defendants then went to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. It was contended that such a decree virtually constituted an ^usurpation of legislative power, but it was upheld^by the Supreme Court which said that ' every injunction in the nature of things, con

templates the enforcement, as against the party enjoined, of a rule of conduct for the future as to the wrong to which the injunction relates." COUNTIES. (Subscription for Entertainment of Political Convention.) Ky. Ct. of App. — When the city of Louisville recently tried to secure the honor of being the meeting place of the Democratic National Convention for 1908, the fiscal court voted an appropriation of ten thousand dollars to be paid to the treasurer of the citizens' committee having the matter in charge. Suit was instituted by the county attorney in the name of the county to restrain carrying the order into effect. Authority to make the expenditure was claimed under a provision of the statute giving power " to appropriate county funds to make provision to secure immigration into the county and advertise the resources of the county." The Supreme Court could not be persuaded to look on the statute in that light but said that "Camp meetings will draw, sometimes, a great many people to the community, and so will one of the large shows that travel about the country. If the fiscal court, under the power to advertise the resources of the county, may make an appro priation to secure the holding of such things in the county, then it is hard to say what the fiscal court may not do under the provisions of this act." The title of the case is Jefferson County v. Peter. It is published in 105 S. W. Rep., 887. COWSTITUTIOUAL LAW. (Citizenship — Action for Death.) D. S. Sup. Ct. — The case of Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Company, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 34, upholding the Ohio statute relative to wrongful death, is a very important decision on the construction of the constitutional guaranty of privileges and immunities of citizens of the different states. The statute provides for the enforcement of a right of action " whenever the death of a citizen of this state has been or may be caused by a wrongful act, negligence, or default in another state ... for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof is given by a statute of such other state." Mrs. Chambers, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued in the Ohio court to recover for the death in the former state, of her husband, a citizen thereof, setting up her right of action under the Pennsyl vania statute, alleging the right to enforce it under the law of Ohio and claiming that if construed literally so as to apply only in case deceased was a citizen of Ohio the statute of that state would be invalid as denying equal privileges and immun ities to citizens of other states. The court held that as the restriction in regard to citizenship related to deceased and not to the parties suing