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ment the master of the stalls said: "Countermand is really a question of fact. It means much more than a change of purpose on the part of the cus tomer. It means, in addition, the notification of that change of purpose to the hank. There is no such thing as a constructive countermand in a commercial transaction of this kind. In my opinion, on the admitted facts of this case, the check was not countermanded in fact, although it may well be that it was due to the negligence of the bank that they did not receive notice of the customer's desire to stop the check. For such negligence the bank might be liable, but the measure of damage would be by no means the same as in an action for money had and received. I agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Lawrence on this point, and that is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. But as we have had an argument addressed to us as to the effect upon the duty of a bank of the mere receipt of a telegram, I wish to add a few words. A telegram may reasonably and in the ordinary course of business, be acted upon by the bank, at least to the extent of post poning the honoring of the check until further inquiry can be made. But I am not satisfied that the bank is bound as a matter of law to accept an unauthenticated telegram as sufficient authority for the serious step of refusing to pay a check." BANKRUPTCY. (Tax .Deed to Property of Bankrupt.) U. S. C. C. A. — The right to take title by tax deed to property of a bankrupt without permission of the Bankruptcy Court, was consid ered in the case of In re Eppstein, i 56 Fed. Rep. 42. The property was sold for taxes prior to institu tion of the bankruptcy proceedings, but the title and possession remained in the bankrupt. During pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the purchaser at the tax sale procured a tax deed and refused to deliver it up to the trustee on tender of the taxes and penalties. Proceedings were instituted to have it set aside upon the ground that the property was in custodia legis, and could not be affected by a deed issued without consent of the bankruptcy court. The contention of the trustee was upheld and the deed -set aside. CARRIERS. (Effect of Hepburn Act on Pen alties Accruing under Elkins Act.) — U.S. Cir. Ct. of App. — The effect of the Hepburn Act on the Elkins Act engaged the attention of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. Rjep. 945. An indictment was returned against the railroad company in November, 1906, for an offense committed in the summer of 1905. The Elkins Act was in force at the time of the offense, but the Hepburn Act went into operation prior to the time of the indict

ment, and it was claimed that it repealed section i of the earlier enactment on which the accusation was based, but the objection was held without merit. It was said that a general repeal of all conflicting laws repeals nothing but what would be repealed by implication, and there being no conflict here, there was no such repeal. There is a special saving clause in the Hepburn Act to prevent it affecting a recovery of penalties in pending actions, but this was held to not exclude the operation of the general saving clause in section 13 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that a repeal shall not affect penalties incurred unless expressly so stated in the repealing- act. Under such a construction of the law, it was. of course, held that recovery of penalties incurred was not affected by the Hepburn Act, though no action therefor was pending at the time of its enactment. CARRIERS. (Municipal Regulation of Street Railroads. N.J. Sup. Ct. — An important decision on the validity of municipal ordinances relating to street railroads, was recently published in 67 Atl. Rep. 1072, under the title N'orth Jersey St. Ry. Co. v. Jersey City. Residents of Jersey City, like those of other centers of population. claimed they were not being furnished adequate street car facilities, and the municipal authorities in attempting to remedy conditions, enacted an ordinance providing that a sufficient number of cars should be run from two of the terminals during the rush hours of the evenings, to furnish each passenger a seat, and keep no one wait.ng longer than five minutes-. It did not appear that the street railways ever attempted to obey the ordinance, but brought certiorari proceedings to test its validity. The court said it was satisfied that more cars could be run than were then in operation, and as the ordinance did not appear unreasonable on its face, the proceedings were dismissed. CONFLICT OF LAWS. (Marriage.) Eng. — A bare statement of the facts in Ogden v. Ogden, heard before the Court of Appeal recently, shows the gravity of the issues involved. An English woman, resident in England contracted a marriage here with a Frenchman, temporarily residing in England. The consent of his father had not been obtained, and therefore, he being under the age of twenty-five years, the marriage was by French law voidable by the father. The latter, accordingly, obtained a decree in France, annulling it. Subse quently, the young man, who had returned to France, married again there. The English wife then sought to obtain a divorce in the English Court, asking in the alternative for a declaration that the French decree of nullity was valid; but