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 THE GREEN BAG JURISPRUDENCE. "The German Civil Code," by J. C. A.," Madras Law Journal (V. xvii, p. 341). LEGISLATION. "Uniformity of Legisla tion," by W. O. Hart, Albany Law Journal (V. Ixix, p. 369). . MASTER AND SERVANT.

"Proposed

Changes in the Fellow Servants'. Law," by George Rice, American Lawyer (V. xv, p. 572). PERSONAL INJURIES. "White's Ana lytical Index of Louisiana Personal Injury Cases," by H. H. White. Dameron-Pierson Co., New Orleans, 1907. Price, §7.50. Ana lyzing every reported personal injury case in Louisiana by giving the title, cause of action, defence, method' of trial, judgment ' of the lower court, judgment, with reasons, of the upper court, date and citation, with a table of amounts awarded for various classes of injury, and a ready reference index. PRACTICE. "Practice of the Learned Professions," by Edwin Maxey, Albany Law Journal (V. Ixix, p. 375). PRACTICE. The " Legal Tactics Series" of addresses before the students of the Law School of Northwestern University is con tinued in the January Illinois Law Review ( . ii, p. 382), by William K. Lowrey, on "The Art of Writing Briefs and Making Legal Argu ments." The author, in preparation, wrote to the chief justices of the appellate courts of twenty-five or thirty states for suggestion arid his address is full of sound advice. He emphasises the fact which Judge Moody reminded us of at Portland last summer, that the quantity of work thrust on our courts of appeal is so great, and records, briefs, and citations are so voluminous, that oral argu ment is essential in order that the vital points be brought to the attention of the court. PRACTICE (Contempt of Court). " Con tempt of Court, Civil and Criminal," by Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Harvard Law Review (V. xxi, p. 161 ). Professor Beale distinguishes different kinds of contempt, suggesting in connection with each the proper limits of action of the court in punishing. From the most ancient times any insult to the king or his government .was punishable as a contempt. Any act which interferes with the operation of the court itself while enga'ged in .the trial of cases, or which

renders the court less able, properly and with dignity, to try cases, is a contempt of court entirely similar in kind to the contempt of the king by insults offered to him. The typical case of this sort is actual disturbance made in the court itself, which interferes with the process of litigation. Any act also which directly obstructs the course of justice, though done outside the court, is equally a contempt of court. A third class of active contempts of of court consists in any interference with persons or property which are in the hands of the court. Although it has been generally assumed that all contempts of court are of the same sort, the active contempt above described is entirely different in nature and origin from the so-called contempt of court which con sists in mere disobedience to an order of the court. From the earliest time a refusal to obey an order of the king or his officer, formally and expressly directed to a subject, has been regarded as a contempt. This, doubtless, was deemed a breach of allegiance. This contempt, by mere disobedience, was often joined, or was alleged to be joined, with an act of dishonor to the lord. Thus, when the contempt consisted in disobedience to the king's writ, a con temptuous treatment of his seal was usual ly charged. But it had very early come to be established that the mere disobedience to a writ under the king's seal was in itself con tempt. This • became- of increasing import ance from the time the lord chancellor adopted the king's -seal as the basis of his judicial power. He had no direct power over property or persons, and no control over an}- executive office, sheriff, constable, or bailiff. The decree of his court derived its force from the fact that it was granted by the keeper of the King's seal and was executed by means of a writ sealed with that seal. Any messenger could convey the writ to the person addressed, and a mere knowledge of the King's will com pelled that person, on his allegiance, to obey without formal service. Disobedience to the order of the court which did not constitute active contempt of court could not be pun ished, since the order of the court, as such, had no legal effect; but disobedience to the King's seal was, as has been seen, a contempt of the King. But as this use of the King's seal