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 AMERICAN CODE OF LEGAL ETHICS injustice in the course of a lengthened speech, by even an ambiguous expression, I find these words reported in the Times : — ' Mr. Phillips said the prosecutors were bound to prove the guilt of the prisoner, not by inference, by reasoning, by such subtile and refined ingenuity as had been used, but by downright, clear, open, palpable demonstration. How did they seek to do this? What said Mr. Adolphus and his witness, Sarah Mancer? And here he would beg the jury not to suppose for a moment, in the course of the narrative with which he must trouble them, that he meant to cast the crime upon either of the femafe servants. It was not at all necessary to his case to do so. It was .neither his interest, his duty, nor his policy, to do so. God forbid that any breath of his should send tainted into the world persons depending for their subsistence on their character.' Surely this ought to be sufficient. I cannot allude, however, to this giant of the press, whose might can make or unmake a reputation, without gratefully acknowledging that it never lent its great circulation to these libels. It had too much justice. ... I find the A/onmtg Herald reporting me as follows: — ' Mr. Adolphus called a witness named Sarah Mancer. But let me do myself justice and others justice by now stating that in the whole course of the narrative with which I must trouble you, I must beg that you will not suppose that I am in the least degree seeking to cast blame upon any of the witnesses.' Can any disclaimer be more complete? And yet, in the face of this, for nine successive years has this most unscrupulous of slanderers reiterated his charge. Not quite three' weeks age he recurs to it in these terms : ' How much worse was the attempt of Mr. Phillips to throws the suspicion of the murder of Lord William Russell on the innocent female servants, in order to procure the acquittal of his client Courvoiser, of whose guilt he was cognizant! I have read with care the whole report in the Times of that three hours' speech and I do not find a passage to give this grave charge counte nance. But surely, in the agitated state in which I was, had even an ambiguous expression dropped from me, the above broad disclaimer would have been its efficient antidote. "Such is my answer to the last charge;

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and, come what will, it shall be my final answer. No envenomed reiteration, no popular delusion, no importunity of friend ship, shall ever draw from me another syllable. . . . His libels and my answer are now before the world, and I leave them to the judgment of all honorable men. C. PHILLIPS." ' So much for the highly interesting experi ence of Mr. Phillips, whose very praise worthy conduct subjected him for the rest of his life to misrepresentation. And now for the code provisions about criminal cases. Section 13 of the Alabama code reads: "13. An attorney cannot reject the defense of a person accused of a criminal offense, because he knows or believes him to be guilty. It is his duty by all fair and honorable means to present such defenses as the law of the land permits, to the end that no one may be deprived of life or liberty, but by the due process of law." 2 That provision has been adopted in Colorado and in Missouri. The other states change the words "fair and honor able means " to "fair and lawful means," while Kentucky and Wisconsin have changed the words " an attorney cannot reject the defense" to "an attorney is not 'bound to reject the defense." If what has above been said about the defense of criminal cases is correct, or 'approximately correct, the rule is incomplete. Accepting the Kentucky and Wisconsin opening words and retaining the words "honorable means," the rule is well enough as it stands if only there be added the clause: "But even in a criminal case an attorney is not justified in bringing forward what he knows to be perjured testimony, or in arguing that such testimony is true when he knows that it is not." Much more might be said about the ethical problems of lawyers. Our moral 1 Quoted in Sharswood Professional Ethics, pp. 111-119 (1854 ed.). 3 Sec. 14, Report of August, 1907, p. 20.