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 AMERICAN CODE OF LEGAL ETHICS judge as to the merits of the cause. Nor should he attempt to influence the trial of the cause by inspiring newspaper comments or discussions. As the Wisconsin code, sec. 17, declares: "Newspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation, call forth discussion and reply from the opposite party, tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise preju dice the due administration of justice. It requires a strong case to justify such publi cations; and when proper, it is unprofessional to make them anonymously. It is better that all newspaper reports be taken from the records and papers on file in the court." But in addition to the foregoing ethical duties, the lawyer owes moral obligations to the court. He must be punctual in his attendance on the court, he must not use personal influence with the judge in favor of his client, he must not display temper because of an adverse ruling, he must defend the courts against unjust criticism and popular clamor, and he must at all times be honest with the court. Much might be said of all these topics, but time forbids. The various state legal codes are in substantial agreement about them. So much then for civil causes. And now a word about the lawyer's ethical duties in criminal cases. There would seem to be no question that the prosecuting attorney, occupying as he does in our legal system a quasi-judicial position, should be impartial in the pre sentation both of facts and of legal author ities in a criminal case. He, at least, is legally and morally bound to reveal' both sides of the case, for he is to seek, not a con viction, but justice. As Gurney, B., said in a case where a prosecutor in a murder case stated facts showing that the death was probably accidental: "The learned counsel for the prosecution has most accurately conceived his duty, which is to be assistant to the court in the furtherance of justice and not to act as counsel foj any particular

person or party."1 For the same reason, and because also it is an attempt to influence court and jury by matter not evidence in the case, a prosecuting attorney has neither legal nor moral right to state that he believes the defendant to be guilty. If he believes the accused to be innocent, it is his duty, however, to say so. But what about the attorney for the defendant in a criminal case? Has he a moral right to defend a man whom he believes to be guilty as charged? The question arises in practical experience far less often than most people suppose, and comparatively few lawyers ever have to face it. It is unfortunately true that the public has imbibed from the newspapers the contrary notion. Comparatively few lawyers arc engaged in the trial of the criminal cases, breach-of-promise suits and divorce cases which furnish such sensational reading in the daily papers, and those lawyers are very far from representing a high type, and yet the public judges all lawyers by such. The fact of the matter is that few lawyers ever have to face a doubt as to the guilt or innocence of a man charged with crime. For the vast majority of law yers the question remains academic, yet is one that has an indirect influence on the lawyer's view of the ethical requirements of civil litigation and must be discussed. Many lawyers regard criminal cases as on a different moral footing from civil, and a lawyer's moral right to defend a guilty man charged with crime as clear. The argument seems to be that a man's life or liberty is not to be taken away if he can prevent; that he has a right to be heard in his defense given him by the law of the land; that the latter right is worthless if no lawyer will present his defense; and that therefore an)' lawyer is justified in presenting the defense, even though he believes the defendant to be guilty. That argument seems to the writer to be fallacious. If the accused is indicted 1 Gurney, B., in Reg. v. Thursfield, S c. & p., 269.