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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES extradition," and in another place in the same opinion the court refers to the immunity from arrest prior to conviction of a crime " not enum erated in the extradition treaty and committed before his removal." These extracts from the opinion of the Rauscher Case indicate that the United States Supreme Court did not intend to hold that a person extradited from a foreign country was immune from trial and conviction of a crime committed after his extradition. MASTER AND SERVANTS. (Torts.) Ga. — If the conductor of a street car while engaged in the prosecution, and within the scope of his busi ness in collecting fares fails and refuses to give a passenger correct change, and, upon request therefor, draws a pistol and fires at the passenger, but the ball misses the passenger and strikes a woman passing on the public street through which the car is running, causing her death, the street car company is liable, according to the recent case of Savannah Electric Co. v. Wheeler, 58 S. E. Rep. 38. The court says that the expressions used in some reports and text-books that a master is bound by the acts of his agent or servant within the scope of his agency and in furtherance of the master's business, or when the servant is acting for the benefit of the master, do not mean that the agent's act must be beneficial to the master or the latter is not bound. A master is liable for the willful torts of his servant, committed in the course of the servant's employment, just as though the master had himself committed them. These two rulings, apparently inconsistent, illustrate the inherent difficulty of application of the general rule to unlawful acts done by an em ployee in protecting the employer's interests where a certain measure of effort was certainly author ized though not the specific means. These two cases might well have been decided precisely to the contrary of the actual ruling. Recent illustrations of the same problem are found in Lipscomb v. R. Co., Tex., 64 S. IV. 923, Holler v. Ross, N. J. L.,53

MASTER AND SERVANT. (Torts.) Penn. — In Shay v. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co., 67 At. Rep. 54, it is held that a corporation is not liable for damages to a house and injuries to the owner by the negligent shooting by men employed to take the place of strikers, where the shooting was directed from defendant's premises against a mob, and was not authorized by defendant, and not within the scope of the employment of the persons doing it. The decision is based on the theory that a master is liable only for injuries resulting from the willful conduct of his servants.

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if inflicted within the scope of their authority or employment. Furthermore, the court holds that the acts of the employes complained of amounting to criminal offenses could not subsequently be ratified by the master. In support of this propo sition is cited Building & Loan Association v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201, 37 Atl. 261; Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447, 37 Am. Rep. 702. This case was made clearer by a somewhat fuller statement of the facts: The corporation had imported a car load of colored men to take the places left vacant by the strikers. The car was taken from the railway station to the defendant's works, followed by a crowd of men and boys, who jumped upon the platform of the car, opened the door and called the inmates vile names. When the colored men left the car and went inside the en closure, the persons congregated on the outside threw stones and other missiles into the enclosure. Shots were fired from both the inside and the out side of the enclosure, one of which caused the in jury complained of. An attempt was made by the plaintiff to prove that the colored men were armed by the defendant or by its direction, but the at tempt failed. The plaintiff's own evidence also showed that those of the men who had revolvers had them without the knowledge of the defendant; that what shooting they did was done against the protests of the person who had them in charge; that they had not been hired to protect the works or the property of the defendant, but simply to per form labor for it. No point was made that the de fendant ought to have foreseen such a difficulty and guarded against it. The question, then, be came in substance this: Where a servant, not armed by the master or known by him to be armed, not charged with any duty of protecting the mast er's works or property, is assailed by a tresspasser, and in resisting the assault, fires shots which injure a third person, can that injury be deemed to be committed by the servant while acting within the scope of his employment? There would seem to be very little difficulty in answering this question in the negative. With respect to the question of ratification, the cases cited were cases involving the ratification of a forgery, concerning which the authorities are in conflict. There can be no doubt, however, that there are many cases wherein the principal might be held liable on the ground of ratification, even though the act was one for which the agent might be punished criminally. Floyd R. Mechem. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. (Use of Streets for Removal of Building.) S. C. N. Y., App. Div. — In Hinman v. Clarke, 105 N. Y. S. 725, it is held that in the absence of a general legislative restric