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THE GREEN BAG

CUSTOMS DUTIES. (Smuggling.) U. S. D.C., S. D. N. Y. — A person may be guilty of smuggling even before he has passed the customs lines on the docks of an incoming steamer, according to the decision in United States v. 218 1-2 Carats Loose Emeralds, 153 Fed. Rep. 643. In this case, it appeared that a person arriving in the United States omitted in his declaration made to the customs officials on shipboard any mention of a package of emeralds contained in his clothing. Furthermore, he falsely stated to the customs officers at the time of the examination of his baggage on the dock that he had no precious stones in his possession. The emeralds were then seized under the federal statute providing for the forfeiture of smuggled goods. It was maintained that as he had not passed the customs lines estab lished on the dock when the emeralds were seized, he was not guilty of smuggling, but the court is of the opinion that when the proper officer of the customs examined the incoming passenger's bag gage and put to him the question whether he had any personal property which he had not declared, or any precious stones upon his person or in his pockets, he was obliged to state the truth, and that when the examination was finished, and he still had these emeralds in his possession, without having admitted it, the act of smuggling was com plete. EVIDENCE. (Carbon Copies.) Minn. — In International Harvester Company v. Elfstrom, 112 N. W. Rep. 252, the Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that the different numbers or impressions produced by placing carbon paper between sheets of paper and writing upon the exposed surface, are duplicate originals, and either may be intro duced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other. The court says there exists a distinction between letter-press copies and carbon copies. A carbon copy is produced at the same time as the original, and is identical with it; a letter-press copy is produced by an act distinct from and subsequent to the consummation of the legal act of executing the original; such copy is ordinarily produced by the labor of clerks and other employes. If the carbon reproduction is complete, the court says there is no practical reason why all the products of the single act of writing the contract and affixing a signature thereto should not be regarded as of equal and equivalent value. As a case supporting this decision the Court cites Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. v. Stock, 51 S. E. 161, 104 Va. 97, and State v. Teasdale, 97 S. W. 995, 120 Mo. App. 692. Another case in point is Cole v. Elwood Power Co. (Pa.), 65 Atl., 678, recently reported in these columns.

This opinion, by Elliott, J., collecting the few prior authorities, is the best on the subject, and makes for the first time the important distinction between carbon copies and blotter-press copies. It also emphasizes the important distinction be tween consummating the legal act in duplicate form and merely copying a transaction already consummated. This decision comes in season to set a good model for the courts which have not yet passed upon the numerous questions arising from the rapid spread of the use of typewritten docu ments. J. H. W. EXTRADITION. (Subsequent Offense.) Cal. — A habeas corpus case dealing with questions as to the rights of persons extradited from a foreign government, which is of particular interest, is the recent case of Ex Parle Collins, 90 Pac. Rep. 827. In this case Collins sought to obtain his release on habeas corpus on the ground that the crime for which he was convicted was another than that for which he was extradited from Canada, but inas much as the crime was committed by Collins after his extradition and after his return to the state of California, the Supreme Court held that he was not entitled to be released, even though he had been given no opportunity to return to Canada before, trial. The court observes that the leading case of United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425, establishes the principle that a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceeding under the extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty, and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until reason able time and opportunity have been given him after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings. But the court notes that in the Rauscher case as well as in every other case that had been called to its attention, the crime for which it was sought to try the extradited prisoner was one alleged to have been committed prior to his extradition, therefore such cases are not regarded as authority in the case at bar. The court finds support for its position in the Rauscher Case itself, wherein the United States Supreme Court in speaking of the right of the accused, says: " That right, as we understand it, is that he shall be tried only for the offense with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings and for which he was delivered up; and that if not tried for that, or after trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable time to leave the country before he is arrested upon the charge of any other crime committed previous to his