Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 19.pdf/718

 NOTES OF RECENT CASES Its power to collect toll is derived from the provi sions of the franchise. It stipulated for no other or further right, and may not exact toll except as therein provided." The franchise in this instance was very definite and precise in its terms. The toll provided for is so much for a vehicle drawn by one beast, and so much more for a vehicle drawn by two or more beasts. Nowhere is any charge mentioned for vehi cles per se. The court cites authorities for the general doctrine that a legislative grant of this sort must be strictly construed, and holds that auto mobiles, not being drawn by beasts, do not come within the provisions of the statute and are not subject to toll. Upon practically identical reasoning, it was held in a number of cases that a bicycle was not subject to toll under very similar statutes. Simson v. Teignmouth and S. Bridge Co., (1901) 85 Law T. 726; Gloucester Turnpike Co. v. Leppe, ( 1898) 62 N. J. L. 92; String v. C. & B. Turnpike Co., (1898) 40 Atl. 774; Murfin v. Detroit and E. Plank Road Co., (1897) 113 Mich. 675; Note, 47 L. R. A. 303. Con tra, Geiger v. P. & R. Turnpike Road Co., (1895) 167 Pa. St. 582. It would seem that an automobile or motor cycle is no more a vehicle drawn by one or more beasts within the wording of these statutes than is the ordinary bicycle when propelled by human power. And yet in Murfin v. Detroit and E. Plank Road Co., (supra) we find the court making a dis tinction between these vehicles according to thenmotive power. The court said, " The bicycle is not subject to the payment of toll by the strict letter of the act. Neither is the motor cycle. Yet we incline to the opinion that payment of toll by the driver of the latter is within the spirit, while such payment by the user of the former is not, be cause of the apparent intention to confine the pay ment of toll to those who do not depend upon thenown powers of locomotion for the propulsion of the vehicle used." This no doubt reaches a desirable result in charging the fast and heavy machines that seriously wear the roadbed, and materially in terfere with other traffic, but it also seems to be a bald effort to read in a legislative intention that is not actually expressed in the statute. As was said in Simson v. Teignmouth and S. Bridge Co. (supra) there must be some limit to the adaptation of the old statutes to modern circumstances. It is im possible that they can be stretched so as to meet everything that invention may produce in modern days. The remedy is amended legislation. The principal case would seem to be undoubtedly correct, but it is merely the decision of a single judge at Trial Term, and it is to be hoped that the question may be passed upon by the higher courts. F. T. C.

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CRIMINAL LAW. (Conspiracy — Statute of Limitations.) U. S. C. C. A., 8th Cir. — One of the main points at issue in Ware v. United States, 154 Fed. Rep. 577, was whether or not 'a conspirator may be prosecuted where the period of limitations has run from the time the conspiracy was formed, but overt acts in the execution of the conspiracy have been committed within the period of limita tions. Judge Sanborn, writing the opinion for the majority, says that the question is answered in the negative in United States v. Owen (D. C.) 32 Fed. 534; U. S. v. McCord (D. C.) 72 Fed. 159, 165, and in Ex parte Black (D. C.) 147 Fed. 832, 841. It is answered in the affirmative in U. S. v. Greene (D. C.) 115 Fed. 343, 347, 349, 350; U. S. v. Greene (D. C.) 146 Fed. 803, 889; Lorenz v. U. S., 24 App. Cas. Dist. of Columbia, 337, 387; U. S. v. Bradford (C. C.) 148 Fed. 413, 416, 419; U. S. v. Brace (D. C.) 149 Fed. 874, 876; Commonwealth v. Bartilson, 85 Pa. 482, 488; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 259, 21 Am. Dec. 122; American Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 75 Miss. 24, 35, 22 South. 99, 102, and Ochs v. People, 25 Ill. App. 379, 414. He says that after a careful reading and consid eration of these and other authorities, the con clusions of the majority of the court are that the true answer to this question is that the existence of the conspiracy and the conscious participation of the defendant therein within the three years, are indispensable to the maintenance of such a prosecution; but that, if these facts are established by competent evidence, such a prosecution may be sustained. From this conclusion Judge Philips dissents on the ground that the gist of the offense is the conspiracy. Overt acts done subsequently in furtherance thereof constitute, if referable to one and the same conspiracy, not several con spiracies, but one and the same conspiracy. In order that subsequent acts should take the conspir acy out of the statute of limitations there must be a new agreement, and overt acts in furtherance of such agreement. CRIMINAL LAW. (Federal Buildings — Juris diction.) U. S. C. C. West. Dist. Ga. So. Div. — In United States v. Battle, 154 Fed. 540, Judge Speer holds that a crime committed on ground acquired by the United States and ceded to it by the state of Georgia for the purpose of a federal building, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court. He holds that the state has authority to cede the ground to the United States, and where it does so, the only power which can exercise jurisdiction over such territory to punish any crime is the United States, even though the state has retained the right to exercise its process thereon. This reservation is made for the reason that the state does not want a federal public build ing to be a refuge for criminals.