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 INTERSTATE EXTRADITION

639

he must have fled from the demanding ance with the Maine statute to the agent of state, and in order to have so fled, he •the state of California. The moment that must have been physically present within the agent left the state of Maine with his that state at the time the crime was com charge, his authority to hold the latter mitted; constructive presence will not suffice; would cease. This difficulty would be met Hyatt v. New York, supra. Again suppose in every state traversed on the journey that X, standing in state A, fires a shot back to California. If all the states trav across the boundary at Y standing in state ersed had similar statutes, the agent could B, which results in the death of Y. It legally hold his prisoner only upon com certainly cannot be denied that the juris plying with the statute of each state as he diction to try A for homicide is in state B, entered it. If any one of them had no both at common law and under prevailing such statute, it is clear that he could not statute law; State v. Hall, 114 North Carolina legally hold his charge within that state. 909, 28 L.R.A. 59, and other cases cited in State legislation would be absolutely effect the note to the last named report of the ive only in a case where the demanding above case. Yet state B cannot get cus and surrendering states immediately ad tody of X under the statute, for the reason joined each other. This difficulty is above stated; State v. Hall, 115 North pointed out and enlarged upon in a note to Carolina 811, 28 L.R.A. 289; Hyatt v. the case of In re Robb, reported in 9 Sawyer New York, supra. Further instances read at page 560. Aside from its practical ily come to mind, but the above are surely significance it may possibly have some sufficient to show that there is an inex bearing on the question of the constitu cusable weakness in the law. It seems evi tionality of such legislation, and in this dent that the defect cannot be remedied by connection it will be noticed later. The constitutional question involved may an amendment of the statute, for the reason that the same defect is inherent in be put as follows: In view of the fact that the Constitution itself. The use of the the Constitution of the United States words "on demand of the executive makes it obligatory upon a state to sur authority of the state from which he fled," render as a fugitive from justice a person in the constitutional provision makes it who is charged with a crime in the de manding state, and who has fled from clear that it is subject to the same con struction as the statute, and contemplates that state in a physical sense, has a state only persons who were physically present the power to pass a law providing for within the demanding state, and fled in the the surrender of a person so charged, irre spective of the question whether or not he physical sense. In view of the difficulty of securing has fled from the demanding state? To an amendment to the Constitution of begin with it is clear that such a law would the United States, the question naturally not be objectionable on the ground that it arises: Can the defect be regulated by invaded the constitutional rights of the state legislation? It may be noted at the person surrendered, for the Supreme Court start that such legislation could not be has held, in Mahon v. Justice, supra, and entirely effective. Suppose that the state in Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 37 L. of Maine had a statute empowering the Ed. 549, that a person accused of crime in governor to surrender fugitives from justice one state has no right to an asylum in an upon demand of other states, that the Gov other state under the Constitution and laws ernor of California demanded the sur of the United States. If it were objection render of a person as a fugitive, and that able, it would be on the ground that under such person was delivered up in accord- the Constitution the power to pass laws