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THE GREEN BAG

Nichols brings to mind most forcibly the fact that there is a great weakness in the pro visions of the Constitution and Statutes of the United States relating to interstate ren dition of fugitives from justice. This mat ter has been discussed by text-writers and courts in the past, but is surely of sufficient importance to warrant further discussion. The second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution reads as follows: "A person charged in any state with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another state, shall on Demand of the Executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Juris diction of the Crime." Section 5278 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, passed pursuant to the above named pro vision of the Constitution, provides that "whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from which the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such per son has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. . . ." The Supreme Court of the United States in Hyatt v. New York, 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. Ed. 657, holds that one who was not within the state when the crime in question was committed, cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the sec tion of the Revised Statutes above quoted, because if not within the demanding state

at that time, he cannot be said to have fled from it. The writer realizes that the question of jurisdiction, where a person, while without the boundaries of a state, commits acts which result in a crime within its boundaries, is by no means simple, but on the contrary raises many intricate prob lems in conflict of laws. It is not necessary for the purpose of this article to go deeply into the intricacies of this subject. It will suffice to refer to certain well established and universally accepted principles. It is the general rule both at common law and by universal statute law that when a person puts into operation a force, which, without the aid of any intervening agency, pro duces a result within the limits of a state, which constitutes a crime under its laws, he is liable to prosecution and punishment at the hands of that state, if jurisdiction can be obtained of his person, although he was not within its boundaries when the force was put into operation or the result ac complished; this is also true when the force is carried out and the result accomplished by means of an innocent agent within the state. To this effect see the cases cited in an article by the well known text-writers, H. C. Underhill and W. L. Clark, in Vol ume XII of the "Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure," at page 208, notes 96 and 97. For instance, suppose that a person, X, makes certain false pretenses in state A, by means of which, through the medium of the mail or of an innocent agent, he obtains money or property in state B, there is no question but that the jurisdiction to try him for the crime of obtaining money or property by false pretenses is in state B; Adams v. The People, 1 New York 173, and other cases cited in the article just above mentioned, at page 2x1, note 18. Yet state B cannot get custody of X under the statute relating to interstate rendition, because he was not physically present within the state at the time the crime was com mitted. In order to be a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the statute