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THE GREEN BAG

loans to residents of Ohio on notes given and payable in Ohio and secured by mortgages on land in the latter state. The payee of the notes had an agent in Ohio to look after his interests there and another in Indiana to take charge of his investments in that state. For some reason it appears that the notes given and payable in Ohio were for a considerable length of time kept in the possession of the Indiana agent. While the notes were in the possession of this agent, the Indiana authorities assessed them for taxation and attempted to collect taxes thereon, princi pally on the ground, as it appears, that the notes were transferred from the Ohio agencv to the Indiana agency in order to escape taxation in Ohio. The court holds that an attempt to escape taxation in Ohio does not confer jurisdiction to tax property asserted to be in Indiana, which lies outside, beyond the jurisdiction of that state. The jurisdiction of Indiana to tax the notes was not conferred or strengthened by reason of the motive which might have promoted the payee to send into Indiana the evidences of debts owing him by residents of Ohio. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that the debt was taxable in the state in which the creditor was domiciled or possibly in the state in which the evidences of the indebtedness alone were held. A dissenting opinion, however, is filed by Justice Day, in which he points out that bills and notes have been recognized as having the character of tangible property. They are tangible things, capable of delivery, passing from hand to hand, and for many purposes may be regarded as of the value of the debt which they evidence. In view of this the fact that municipal bonds or other securities may be taxed where held. Justice Day is of the opinion that there is no constitutional objection to the localization of the notes for taxation and that hence they may be taxed where held. CONTEMPT. (Absence of Attorney from Court. ) St. Louis Ct. of App. —- The absence of an attorney from the court in which he has business and when he should be there to attend to it and when his absence delays or impedes the court's business is, in In re Clark, 103 S. W. Rep. 1105, held to con stitute contempt of court. An attorney at law is an officer of the court, and it is as much incum bent on him to attend the sittings of the court when a case in which he is of counsel is on trial, and which trial cannot proceed in his absence, as it is for the sheriff or the clerk of the court to be present. The absence of an attorney in certain circumstances unavoidably causes delay in the administration of justice, which is a criminal con tempt; if not a contempt, then the administration of justice in the courts of the state would be at

the mercy of attorneys, and they, instead of being aids to the court in the administration of justice, might become an insufferable obstruction to its administration by merely remaining away from court when it was their duty to be in attendance CONTRACTS. (Legality — Contract not to make a Will.) Ill. — The doctrine that an owner of property may make a valid enforceable con tract binding himself not to dispose of his property by will and to permit his possessions to descend according to the law of intestacy, is affirmed in the recent case of Jones v. Abbott, 81 North eastern Reporter, 791 on authority of Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229, and Taylor v. Mitchell, 87 Pa. 518, 30 Am. Rep. 383. COURTS. (Original Jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court.) U. S. S. C. — The United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. West Virginia, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732, held that its original juris diction extends to a suit by the Commonwealth of Virginia against the state of West Virginia to determine the amount due to the former by the latter as the equitable portion of the public debt of the original state of Virginia which was assumed by West Virginia at the time of its creation as a state. This decision was rendered on demurrer to the bill. Consideration of the objections of multi fariousness, misjoinder of parties and of causes of action the court holds may properly be postponed until final hearing. EMINENT DOMAIN. (Interurban Railroads.) Ind. — The extensive development of interurban railroads is gradually narrowing the distinction between the rights of commercial railroads, or so-called steam railroads, and street railroads proper, as interurban roads in many instances partake of the nature of both. In Kinsey v. Union Traction Co., 81 N. E. Rep. 922. one of the main contentions was whether or not interurban cars operated on the streets of a city with its per mission, for the carriage of passengers, express and light freight, by a corporation unorganized under the street railway laws, constituted an additional servitude on the streets so as to entitle abutting owners to additional compensation for the use of the streets. Three of the judges, Hadley, Gillett and Mounts, were of the opinion that the operation of the cars did not constitute an additional servitude, while two judges, Jordan and Montgomery, held the contrary. EQUITY. (Cancellation of Birth Certificate.) N. J. — In Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 At. Rep. 97, it appears that a birth certificate was made by the physician present at the birth of a child. This certificate set forth among other things as required by law, as far as the facts could be ascertained.