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THE GREEN BAG

are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.' Story, J., in Martin v. Huntter's Lessee, i Wheat., 304, 326. 'The Government of the United States is one of delegated, limited, and enumerated powers.' United States v. Harris, 106 U. S., 629, 635" The court then considered the powers conferred on Congress by Section 8 of Article r, emphasizing its conclusion that they bestowed upon Congress no authority over arid lands. In the course of the dis cussion of that subject, the court cited with approval the canon of construction laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 405, adding, "Yet while so construed, it still is true that no unmentioned power passes to the na tional government or can rightfullv be exercised by the Congress." Examining the claim of the government that congressional authority over arid land is given by Section 3 of Article 4, which prescribes in part that " The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," the court says: "But clearly it does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the states, and must so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits. Appreciating the force of this, counsel for the government relies upon ' the doctrine of sovereign and inherent power,' adding 'I am aware that in advancing this doctrine I seem to challenge great decisions of the court, and I speak with deference. His argument runs substantially along this line: All legislative power must be vested in either the state or the national govern ment; no legislative powers belong to a state government other than those which affect solely the internal affairs of that state; consequently all powers which are national in their scope must be found vested in the Congress of the United States.

But the proposition that there are legisla tive powers affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the Amend ments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting certain specified things made operative to grant other and distinct things. This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the Tenth Amend ment. . . . "We are not here confronted with a ques tion of the extent of the powers of Congress, but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on its action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule and spirit of con struction must also be recognized. If pow ers granted are to be taken as broadly granted and as carrying with them author ity to pass those acts which may be reason ably necessary to carry them into full exe cution, in other words, if the Constitution in its grant of powers is to be so construed that Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the powers granted, it is equally imperative that where prohibition or limi tation is placed upon the power of Congress that prohibition or limitation should be enforced in its spirit and to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed, and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed. Especially is this true when in respect to grants of powers there is as here tofore noticed the help found in the last clause of the eighth section, and no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions and limitations. The true spirit of consti tutional interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the lan guage, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose." In this last sentence of Mr. Justice Brewer is to be found the just rule by which the courts, the Congress and the citizen can determine with reasonable certainty whether proposed federal action is within its author