Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 19.pdf/533

 500

THE GREEN BAG

employed by the driver's employers, was never theless engaged in their business, and they were therefore liable for his negligence as well as tne negligence of the driver. The court distinguishes the case at bar from Long v. Richmond, 68 App. Div. 472, 73 N. Y. Supp. 912, affirmed in 175 N. Y. 495, 67 N. E. 1084. on the ground that in the latter case the offending third person was not engaged in the defendant's business at the time of the accident complained of. PUBLIC LANDS (Jurisdiction). U. S. Sup. Ct. — The extent to which the rulings of the United States Land Office are conclusive, receives further elucidation in the case of Love v. Flahive. 27 Sup. Ct. 486, recently decided by the United States Supreme Court. In this case it appears that the Secretary of the Interior had made find ings to the effect that a party to a controversy before the Land Office had a right to enter land as a homestead. It was contended that such find ing was conclusive, so that the Land Office could not subsequently, and before patent had issued, institute further inquiry and on such inquiry finally award the land to a party held to have a better right than the one to whom it had been awarded in the first instance. This contention was based on the rule that the conclusions of the Secretary of the Interior are, in the absence of fraud or imposition, conclusive on the courts on matters of fact. The court holds, however, that while the jurisdiction of the Land Office over a land case ceases when once a patent had issued, and that while it may be conceded that a right of prop erty may become vested by the decision of the Land Office, of which the occupant cannot be deprived except by proceedings directly therefor, and of which he has notice, the jurisdiction of the Land Office does not terminate until a legal title has passed, and until a patent has issued the department may make further inquiry, the parties having notice of the proceedings. Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; 35 L. Ed. 074; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208, 42 L. Ed. 591. Another point of interest to home steaders especially-, is decided in this case, to the effect that a sale of a homestead claim, before patent is issued, although void, may by the Land Office be treated as a relinquishment or abandon ment of the homestead application and entry. SALES (Conditional Sales). Iowa. — In Fla herty v. Ginsberg, no N. W. Rep. 1050. it appeared that defendant had sold household furniture to plaintiff on a contract giving the vendor the right to retake the property on a

failure of the purchaser to pay the instalments thereof as they became due. After two instal ments had become past due, defendant insisted on taking the goods unless the arrears were paid. Plaintiff told defendant's agent that she had been sick and needed the goods; that she desired to hold them longer and try to pay for them herself. The court held that plaintiff had no ground of recovery against defendant for re-possessing the goods and that the mere fact that the purchaser is in ill health, and needs the goods, does not make its retaking under the contract wrongful. To have such effect the purchaser's needs must be such that to deprive her of the goods would be to expose her to increased sickness and suffering, and such facts must be known to the person demanding and removing the property. TAXATION (Exemption of National Securi ties from State Taxation). U. S. Sup. Ct. — A tax imposed under authority of section 1322 of the Code of Iowa, directing that shares of stock of state banks shall be assessed to such banks and not to individual stockholders, was in Home Sav ings Bank v. City of Des Moines, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571, held to violate the immunity of national securities from state taxation, as the substantial effect of the tax was to require taxation upon the property, not including the franchises, of such state banks, and to adopt the value of the shares as the measure of taxable valuation of such prop erty, without permitting any deduction from such valuation on account of bonds of the United States owned by the banks. The court in arriv ing at the decision distinguishes the case at bar from the line of cases in which it has been held that a state may levy a tax upon the value of the franchises of corporations created by it or upon the right of succession of property on the death of its owner without first deducting the amount of United States security owned by the corpora tion whose franchise is taxed or by the estate transmitted under the inheritance law of the state. The theory of such cases is that the taxes are not imposed on the assets of the corporation or the property of the decedent but in the one case upon the franchise granted by the state and in the other case upon the right of succession to property on the death of the owner which is con ferred by the state. The court also notes that the case of Van Allen v. Assessors (Churchill v. Utica) 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. Ed. 229, has settled the law that a tax upon the owners of shares of stock in corporations, in respect to that stock, is not a tax upon United States securities which the corpora tions own and that accordingly such taxes have been sustained whether levied upon shares of