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THE GREEN BAG

growing out of the contractual relation etsablished by the shipment of goods must be brought within five years. {Code de Commerce, Art. 108.) II. Carriers of Passengers. The nature of a carrier's liability for injuries to passengers from accidents is fre quently stated by text-writers to be con tractual. The decisions of the courts, on the contrary, generally treat it as a ques tion of tort. As concerns the evidence, the rule is the opposite of that in actions for damages for loss of or injury to goods, the burden being on the plaintiff in actions for personal injuries, to prove the fault of the carrier. This principle is supported by a long line of decisions, though there are some which contradict it. (See Paris, 27 July, 1892, Cie. Generate des Omnibus, S. & P. '93-2-93.) In case of damage to a parcel carried by a passenger, recovery may be had only on proof of negligence on the part of the car rier. This appears to be on the ground of absence of contract. (See Trib. Civ. de la Seine, 29 Jan. 1898, Dalloz Pe'riodique, 1 900-2- 17 2.) The liability of the carrier may be grouped under the following heads: — 1. Liability for injuries due to negli gence of employes or agents; 2. Liability for the use of defective material; 3. Liability for injuries due to the actions of third persons which proper diligence would have prevented. Where an attempt was made to assassi nate a passenger, and no violation of adminstrative rules on the part of the company was shown, the latter was held not liable. (Paris, 16 Dec, 1873, James.) And when, in time of war, an officer took possession of a train and commanded it to be run under his instructions, the company was held not liable for a collision which ensued, (Trib. Seine, 15 Feb., 1874.) A

carrier is not liable for damages due to defective material if proper care has been used in its purchase or selection. (Trib. Seine, 4 Aug., 1872.) Contributory negligence bars recovery. But the courts sometimes allow partial recovery on a theory similar to the doctrine of Comparative Negligence. Thus by judg ment of 24 March, 1904, reported in Dalloz, Receuil de Jurisprudence, Part 2, p. 54, in the cases of Chemin de Fer du Nord c: Guevord et Vinart, the plaintiffs were denied relief on the ground that their in juries were due, primarily, to their having been, without authority, on the grounds of the Railway Company. While in the case of Chemins de Fer de l'Ouest c: Langlois, reported same volume and page, where plaintiff's intestate was killed by being thrown from a train by the sudden starting of the locomotive after having once stopped, the Appellate Court sustained a finding for the plaintiff but reduced the amount of the judgment, because the plaintiff's intestate was negligent in leaving his seat before the train had stopped. (See also Repertoire du droit Francais, 1893, Vol. 10, p. 640, Art. 4308 bis.) III. Control of Railroads: Regu lation of Rates. At the time of the substitution of loco motives for horse-power on passenger lines the Legislative power succeeded the Exec utive in regulating rates and other details of railway traffic. The question of the ground of the state's right to interfere has given rise to a number of theories which, however interesting they may be as matters of academic discussion, throw little light on the present powers of the state or the future government of the roads. Suffice it to say that many roads have been built with the assistance of the state, by means of loans, subsidies or guarantees of interest, and there is now a tendency to take over the roads and run them as government