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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES what conditions will make an insurance contract severable. In some jurisdictions, it is held that where the property insured consists of different items which are separately valued or insured for separate amounts, the contract is divisible, and a breach of warranty or condition as to one item will not affect the insurance on the remainder of the property, even though the premiums be entire. Again, in some jurisdictions, it is held that such contracts are entire, and a breach of any condition vitiates the whole insurance. The better rule, however, appears to be that where the property is so situated that the risk on one item cannot be affected without affecting the risk on the other items, the policy must be regarded as entire; but where the property is so situated, that the risk on each item is separate and distinct from the risk on the other items, so that what affects the risk on one item does not affect the risk on the others, the policy must be regarded as severable. This latter rule has now received the approval of the California Supreme" Court in the case of Goorberg v. Western Assur. Co., 89 Pac. 130. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Negligence.) Mo. App. — What will constitute constructive notice to a municipality of a defect in a street is the main point at issue in Vance v. Kansas City, 100 S. W. Rep. 110 1. This was an action for injuries received by falling over a pile of build ing stone placed in the street. It appeared that though the particular stone over which plain tiff fell had been placed there only a few hours before the injury, other loads had been left un guarded for three days, continuously maintaining the obstruction. Under such circumstances the court held that an instruction that the piling of the last lot was too short a time before the acci dent to impart constructive notice to the c.ty, was erroneous. The identity of the stone, the court considered, was of no moment so long as the obstruction was continuously maintained. This decision the court regards as supported by Drake v. Kansas City, 190 Mo. 370, 88 S. W. 689, 109 Am. St. Rep. 759. But on this point, see Hutchins v. Inhabitants of Littleton, 124 Mass. 889; Breil v. City of Buffalo 144 N. Y. 163, 38 N. E. 977, and Mattimore v. City of Erie, 144 Pa. 14, 22 Atl. 817. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Negligence — Automobile Races.) N. Y. Ct. of App. — Johnson v. City of New York, 78 N. E. Rep. 715 denies the right of a municipality under the New York Laws to authorize an automobile club to conduct speed trials on a highway and suspend ordinances regulating the speed of vehicles. By doing so, it is held that the city participates in the com mission of the unlawful act of speeding auto

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mobiles at a greater rate of speed than allowed by law. The case at Bar was an action for injuries received by a spectator at an automobile race. The main question was whether plaintiff could recover though she knew that the race was illegal. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (109 App. Div. 821, 96 N. Y. Sup. 754) appears to have attached much importance to the fact whether plaintiff knew that the race was illegal, and the court of appeals observes that in some jurisdictions the law is, that a participator in an illegal exhibition is without right to recover in case of. injury, but such, the court says, is not the law in New York. In support of this state ment is cited Platz v. City of Cohoes, 89 N. Y 219, 42 Am. Rep. 286. Plaintiff, in that case, while driving on Sunday for the purpose of plea sure, was injured from a detect in one of the streets of defendant. It was held that the fault of plaintiff in driving on the Sabbath was not to be considered a defense to the action and did not constitute the proximate cause of the accident. The same principle, the court remarks, is appli cable to the case at Bar. The illegality of the speed contest does not create a liability against the defendants if they were at fault in the con duct of the race in no other respect. On the other hand, it does not preclude a recovery by plaintiff if the injury was caused to her by mis conduct or fault of the defendants. As support ing this proposition, the court further cites Scanlon v. Wedger, 156 Mass. 462, 31 N. E. 642, 16 L. R. A. 395; Frost v. Josselyn, 180 Mass 389, 62 N. E. 469. The court overrules the opinion of the Appellate Division in this case, which was previously noted in this department. See, 96 N. Y. Supp. 754, 109 App. Div. 821. NEGLIGENCE. (Duty of Care.) — A sur prising extension of the doctrine of Heaven v. Pender appears in Depue v. Flateau, Ill. N. W. Rep. 1. It appears in this case that plaintiff visited the home of defendant in the course of his business as a cattle buyer, and that while there he was taken with a fainting spell. Prior to this he had made a request for lodging of defend ant and had been refused, and after recovering slightly from his indisposition, plaintiff renewed his request and was again refused. With the assistance of defendant's son, plaintiff got into his sleigh and started homeward. The follow ing morning he was discovered by a passing farmer, nearly frozen to death some distance from his home and taken there. Plaintiff thereafter brought this action on the theory that his injuries were occasioned solely by defendant's neglect and wrongful conduct in refusing him lodging. Defendant insisted that he owed plaintiff no duty