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 NOTES OF RECENT CASES before referred to and which perhaps goes farther than any other in strictly construing the words "sectarian instruction" as they are found in the various state constitutions. Andrew A. Bruce. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ' (License Tax.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — The right of a state to impose a license tax on the business of selling intoxicating liquors within the state by any traveling sales man who solicits orders is upheld in Delamater v. South Dakota, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 447, as under the Wilson act the power of a state attaches to intoxicating liquors when shipped into the state from another one after delivery, but before the sale in the original package, so as to authorize the state to regulate or forbid such sale. The court holds that it follows that the regulation by the state of the business carried on within its borders of soliciting proposals to purchase in toxicating liquors, even though such liquors are situated in other states, cannot be held to be repugnant to the commence clause of the Con stitution, because directly or indirectly burdening the right to sell in the state — a right which, by virtue of the Wilson act, does not exist. It was contended that as under the Wilson act a resident of one state has the right to contract for liquors in another state and receive the liquors in the state of his residence for his own use, an agent or traveling salesman of a nonresident dealer in intoxicating liquors has the right to go into the state and there carry on the business of solicit ing from residents orders for liquors, to be con summated by acceptance of the proposals by the nonresident dealer whom he represents. This premise the court says is sound, but the error lies in the deduction, since it ignores the broad distinction between the want of power of a state to prevent a resident from ordering from another state liquor for his own use, and the plenary authority of a state to forbid the carrying on within its borders of the business of soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors situated in another state, even although such orders may only con template a contract to result from final accept ance in the state where the liquor is situated. The distinction between the two is not only obvious, but has been foreclosed by a previous decision of the court. That a state may regulate and forbid the making within its borders of in surance contracts with its citizens by foreign insurance companies or their agents is certain. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. Ed. 497, S Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. But that this power to prohibit does not extend to preventing a citizen of one state from making a contract of insurance in another state is also

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settled. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. CORPORATIONS. (Foreign — Doing Business.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — In Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513, the federal supreme court holds that the ownership by a foreign railway company of the controlling interest in the stock of a domestic railway which retains its own officers, has property of its own, and is responsible for its contracts and to persons with whom it deals, does not make the foreign corporation liable to service of process within the state on the theory that it is doing business therein through the agency of the domestic cor poration. The fact that the foreign railway owns the controlling amount of the stock of the domestic company and has thus the power to change the management, does not give it present control of the corporate property and business so as to make it amenable to process in the state. Among the authorities relied on may be cited Conley t;. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. Sup. 406, 23 Sup. Ct. 728, 47 L. Ed. 1113, and Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Missouri Pacific R. £0., 115 U. S. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. 194, 29 L. Ed. 499. Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., recently decided but not yet reported by the Federal Supreme Court, is an important case on this same question of " doing business." The plaintiff, a resident of Pennsyl vania, was injured while traveling on the defendant railway in Colorado. Defendant is an Iowa cor poration. Suit was brought in the U. S. Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and a motion was made to vacate the service on the ground that defendant was not " doing business " in Pennsylvania. The facts were undisputed and were that defendant had an office in Philadelphia, Pa., on the windows and door of which the defendant's name was displayed. Defendant's name was in the city directory and telephone book. In the office the defendant employed a District Freight and Passenger Agent, who had assistants, clerks and stenographers under him, all employed by the defendant. Passenger tickets were not for sale at the office and the business was principally solicit ing freight and passenger traffic. Anyone wishing to ship freight over the defendant railway from its junction with any other line could surrender his bill of lading and obtain a receipt in the form of a bill of lading which was, by its express terms, not binding on the defendant or in force until the goods were received by the defendant. The Phila delphia agent also sold orders for reduced rate tickets to employees of other railroads. The Cir cuit Court made the rule to vacate service absolute