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 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT PRACTICE (Contingent Fees). "Attorneys and Counsellors," by Henry H. Ingersoll, in the June Yale Law Journal (V. xvi, p. 577), defends as entirely legitimate and reasonable the taking of cases by lawyers on contingent fees, and attacks the motives of some of those who condemn the practice. "This censure has never been directed against the commercial lawyers for charging commissions on their collections. And yet what is that but taking contingent fees? Is this exemption from blame awarded because they represent the creditor class or because the actions which they bring are ex contractu? Their functions surely belong to ' business ' rather than ' profession '; and surely there is no logic or law for censuring one class of lawyers for plaintiff, those who bring actions to obtain compensation for breaches of social and legal duty, and passing without query, even, the class who sue for breaches of contract. . . . "This new ethical movement for the regu lation of attorneys and counsellors, if not originated by the great insurance, railway, mining and manufacturing corporations, seems to have their undivided support. The presidents, directors and general counsel greatly admire those noble professional institutions of London, the Inns of Court, and unanimously appreciate and approve their stringent rules and venerable authority. They are true exponents of the common law, existing ' time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,' and their customs and usages speak to them with the authority of the ages. Their members not only may not take contingent fees — they may not invoke the aid of the courts to collect the fees they have earned, whether upon express or implied contracts; nor may they soil their hands with any of the details or drudgery of preparation of cases. . . . "This justly distinguished body of gentle men, the English Bar, professional sacrosancts of a foreign land, are held up for imitation to the American attorneys and counsellors, and our decadence deeply deplored in the hall of the general counsel. We are actually doing the work of solicitors and attorneys, the busi ness of the profession. Just as in England, our clerks ' introduce ' clients — as also do other attorneys and solicitors — and may

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stipulate for part of the fees. Like the Eng lish solicitors, we may make advances for our client and pay the expenses of his action; or, since lawing may be done on credit in America, we may become his surety for costs, to the end that he may obtain legal justice in the courts; and some even have shocked the deli cate sense of honor of the general counsel by receiving conditional fees from the victims of negligence or fraud, or their helpless widows, in the unequal contest for compensation which they must needs wage with their power ful and conscienceless adversaries. . . . "And yet, say the corporation moralists, you must not stipulate for a contingent fee, although it would be proper to await the result and then take or accept proper com pensation! Indeed! Sit as judge in your own case, or ' have a scrap ' with your client over your fee at the end, when agreement beforehand might have avoided both horns of the ugly dilemma! Is there any good reason for leaving the solid ground of common sense and flying into the empyrean for solution of this practical problem of ethics? ," The courts of civilization are substitutes for the bludgeon and torch of barbarism, and those suffering legal wrongs are invited to come to them for redress. Widows and. orphans of killed employees must have lawyers to enable them to accept the invitation. The American attorney and counsellor is rarely a gentleman of fortune who can afford to carry on such litigation without fee or reward or the hope or promise thereof. If the statutes of champerty and maintenance forbid con tingent fees and material assistance, he obeys them, and does the best he can for himself and client, and, if successful in some way gets quantum meruit at the end. But if the laws do not forbid it, and both himself and client prefer to this uncertainty a definite arrange ment, a fixed per centum of the recovery, what principle of ethics can forbid the agreement, or deny to himself and client in limine the right of contract enjoyed by all other citizens, subject to the same legal and equitable rules?" PLEADING. " Eighteenth Century Plead ing," by John A. Inglis, in the April Juridical Review (V. xix, p. 42), gives many interesting and amusing illustrations selected from eigh teenth century Scotch court papers.