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THE GREEN BAG

Wall. 300, 21 L. Ed. 179; New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 1 ro. 44 I.. Ed. 174, and cases cited therein. But it was urged that as the insurance company was organized with its princi pal place of business in New York, and as the policy holder must go thither for collection of his claim, the proceeds of the policy must be regarded as property taxable in New York; and in support of this contention were cited the cases of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439; Matter of Houdaver's Estate, 150 N. Y. 37, 44 N. E. 718, 34 L. R. A. 235, 55 Am. St. Rep. 642; and Matter of Clinch's Estate, 180 N. Y. 300, 73 N. E. 35. The court, however, could not agree that the cases cited were applicable in this case, for in each of those cases the creditor unlike the beneficiary of the policy in this case was really under the necessity of going to the domicile of the debtor in New York for protection and collection of his claim. In view of the general policy of the states to compel foreign insurance companies seeking to do business to submit to the juris diction of the local courts by provision for sub stituted service, the court regards itself entirely justified in its view that this class of legislation was distinctly intended to abrogate the very idea that insured could only obtain redress by resorting to the laws of the state wherein the insurance company had its organization and principal place of business which is made the basis of taxation in the decisions above cited. As confirming this view, the court cites New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct. 364, 28 L. Ed. 379; and Sulz v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 14s N. Y. 563, 40 N. E. 242, 28 L. R. A. 379. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (National Flag.) U. S. S. C. — In Halter v. State, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 419, the Supreme Court of the United States up holds the constitutionality of the Nebraska Law of 1903, making it a misdemeanor to use repre sentations of the national flag upon articles of merchandise for advertising purposes. By way of preface the court notes that the constitution ality of a similar law has been denied in two cases — Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N. E. 41, 49 L. R. A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30; People ex rei. McPike v. Vandecarr, 178 N. Y. 425, 70 N. E. 965, 102 Am. St. Rep. 516, 66 L. R. A. 189. In the Illinois case the statute was held to be uncon stitutional as depriving a citizen of the United States of the right of exercising a privilege im pliedly, if not expressly, given by the Federal Con stitution, as unduly discriminating and partial in its character, and as infringing the personal liberty guarantied by the state and Federal Constitution. In the other case, appealed from the Court of Appeals of New York, the statute in its applica

tion to articles manufactured and in existence when it went into operation, was held to be in violation of the Federal Constitution, as depriving the owner of property without due process of law, and as taking private property for public use with out just compensation. In the first place the court takes the position that the protection of the national flag against use for illegitimate purposes is not so exclusively within the power of Congress as to prevent action by state legislatures on the failure of congress to act. In the second place the court holds that the law in question does not vio late any privilege of American citizenship, nor any right of personal liberty, nor does it invade any property rights. As the law contains an exception in favor of newspapers, books, phamphlets, etc., on which shall be printed representations of the national flag, disconnected from any adver tisement, it was contended that the law violated the 14th Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws. The court here notes that all are alike forbidden to use the flag as an advertisement. It is easy to be seen how a representation of the flag may be wholly disconnected from advertise ment and be used upon periodicals, books, etc., in such a way as not to arouse a feeling of indig nation nor offend the feelings of those who respect and reverence it. In any event, the court regards the classification made by the state to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. There can be little doubt as to the constitutionality of a law of this kind making it a misdemeanor to use representations of the national flag upon articles of merchandise for advertising purposes. As the flag is, with us, the symbol of sovereignty, in a more emphatic sense than anywhere else in the world, chiefly because we cannot personify national sovereignty in a president usually elected by a strict party vote, it may be of interest to consider what principles are applied in monarchical countries when the name or title of the sovereign, the expression of national sovereignty, is used for advertising or other similar purposes. For the sake of brevity we will confine ourselves to the Civil Code of the German Empire. Here it is to be noted that the name or title of the sovereign is not expressly protected as such. What ever protection is given to the emperor must be found in that section of the Code which provides that anyone whose rights or interests are violated through the unlawful use by another of his name, may demand of the offender the removal of what ever injury has resulted and may, in case of reason able apprehension of further injuries, secure an injunction. See section 12, BGB. The name or title of the emperor or of any member of the imper ial house are generally used in connection with (1) ships, boats, launches, etc; (2) hotels, restaurants,