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 SAMUEL NELSON Tyler in 1845 to succeed Mr. Justice Thomp son as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The circum stances leading to his appointment clearly indicate the high appreciation of his judicial career and character entertained at the time by the general public and the representa tives of all parties in national affairs. The majority of the Senate was politically op posed to the President, and even personally hostile, owing to his abandonment of the party by which he had been elevated to his high office, and it was evident that his nomi nation for such an important post must be clearly unexceptionable to receive a confirma tion. The President first selected John C. Spencer, one of the great lawyers of his time, who had a been member of his cabinet, and whose political predilections were in unison with those of the senatorial majority. But he had given umbrage to his fellow par tisans by remaining in the cabinet after the death of President Harrison, and was rejected for that reason. The appointment was next tendered to Silas Wright, then a senator of the United States, who declined it from an ap prehension that his long withdrawal from the active practice of the profession had un fitted him for the proper discharge of judicial duties. The President then selected Chan cellor Reuben H. Walworth, whose judicial career commenced at the same time with that of Judge Nelson, he having been ap pointed by Governor Yates in 1823 as circuit judge of the fourth circuit, which position he had retained until his appointment as chancellor in 1828. The Senate, however, delayed action on the nomination for so long a period that the President finally with drew it, and without any expectation on the part of Judge Nelson or his friends, nominated him for the vacancy; and the nomination was immediately and unani mously confirmed. Having reached the summit of judicial honor and influence, some apprehensions were entertained by those who were not conversant with the old judicial system of

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New York, which required him to keep in touch with the "gladsome light" of equity jurisprudence, or who were not familiar with his habits of thorough and systematic inves tigation of all questions that came before him as a judge, that his long and large experience in the common law courts might render it difficult for him to conform to the more modern and in some respects more liberal methods prevailing in the federal tribunals, especially in the administration of maritime, prize and international law. He soon, however, demonstrated, to the delight and admiration of the bar, his ability to discharge the additional duties and to comply with all the conditions imposed upon him in the exercise of his new jurisdiction. He grappled successfully with the most intri cate and perplexing problems of National jurisprudence, including those involved in the then comparatively recent branch of patent litigation, frequently requiring the mastery of the most abstruse and compli cated questions of physical science and the mechanical arts; and he became in later years an acknowledged authority in this particular department of judicial investi gation. Notwithstanding his patience and indus try in the elucidation of evidence or legal research, his opinions were invariably couched in simple English, and confined to the terse and direct expression of his views on the vital issues of the case. He never indulged in elaborate discussions of academic questions, and his successors on the bench will seldom be annoyed or misled by his obiter dicta. Perhaps no better illustration of his wisdom and moderation, and of his accurate perception of judicial propriety in this respect, can be given than his opinion in the celebrated case of Dred Scott. The case affords a most effective and impressive les son to the judiciary of the perils and dis asters that may be incurred by the needless assumption of extra-judicial power and responsibility. The case came before the Supreme Court