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 JUDICIAL MANNERS their fellow juror and have attended the funeral in a body, or the single juror might have been accompanied by court officers or the judge himself. No great principle of public policy would have prevented, be cause the coincidence is rare of a parent's death while a juror is actually serving. A second example: An accident case is being tried before a civil court. A physi cian is subpoenaed as a witness. He is in attendance upon a patient who is danger ously ill. He fails to respond to the sum mons from the court, sending word that he is at the bedside of a patient. When he reaches court, he is severely reprimanded by the judge, who is reported as laying down the principle that the mandate of the court must be obeyed, even as against the most imperative call of one's professional duty. The defense calls witness after witness, each one of whom breaks down under the skillful cross-examination of plaintiff's coun sel. Finally the judge says, "Well, have you any more of those up-country liars?" There is a verdict for the plaintiff, but of course it must be set aside by the court in banc because of the gross indiscretion of the trial judge. The case is tried again, and the jury finds that the "up-country liars" were telling the truth. It will be long before they forget the judge who put such an aspersion upon them. An election case is pending, and a member of the ward committee is called to the stand. The court asks him how many names are on the assessor's list in his divi sion. He is unable to remember the exact number, whereupon the judge exclaims, "You're not fit to be a member of the ward committee, or you're lying!" Counsel for the plaintiff, after the defen dant's evidence is all in, asks for binding instructions on the ground that defendant has not made out a case. The motion is granted; but the judge calling the plaintiff to the bar of the court, rebukes him, saying sharply, "If you had acted with ordinary care, as a prudent man should have done,

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there would have been no loss to anyone, and this suit would not have been necessary!" A young and nervous advocate protests courteously, but in unfortunate phrase, against what he believes a premature entry of judgment against his client. "But under these authorities, your honor, you cannot enter judgment against a garnishee until the notes outstanding have been impounded." "Oh! can't I enter judgment?" said the judge, lifting up his pen, "I'll show you." And he did. Often the judicial rebuke is both justified and merited. A judge objects to counsel for a rule reading at great length from numerous authorities. Counsel insists. When he sits down the court says, "Mr. Blank, your rule was discharged just one hour ago." Counsel for the appellee in the Supreme Court foolishly insists upon his client's "con stitutional right to be heard" although the court plainly show, by saying that they do not care to hear from the appellee, that they propose to affirm the judgment. At the close of his unnecessary argument, the chief justice bitingly remarks, "Notwith standing your argument, Mr. Smith, we are still of the opinion that your opponent has no case." A woman lawyer, granted special extension of time, argues for more than a day in favor of the right of women to exer cise the elective franchise. As she takes her seat, the chief justice says, "Notwith standing the able and exhausting argument on behalf of the appellant, we believe the judgment must be affirmed." Surely allow ance can be made for such reproof as this. Not even for the dignity of the office would we ask that the Bench endure everything. "Your honors, there has been stupidity in this case, and it's not on this side of the bar." But the Bench, on this occasion, had the last word, " Mr. Blank, we feel that there has been discourtesy in this case, and it's not on this side of the bar!" Wits there have been who have had their fling at the failings of the judicial office. "A judge should be a gentleman; and if