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 FAIR COMPETITION

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lem of the place of competition in the law, dant's purpose by the act was to break plain fair competition is considered as a matter tiff up in business would not give the cause of justification upon grounds of policy. of action, for that is the natural result of The accepted theory is that every man successful competition." It is submitted that both of these cases engaged in business has a right prima facie to have his custom undisturbed; in this are good law, but it would be impossible view a person who diverts trade from him to reconcile them without the theory here commits a tort prima facie. But if this defended; however, this general theory is trade is invaded in the course of fair com now so well accepted that it no longer petition there is a recognized justification, requires an elaborate defense. Indeed, while there is no valid excuse in the case of every one of the now innumerable suits for unfair competition. The comparison of two unfair competition is really based upon this theory, for in last analysis the plaintiff in all cases may bring this out more clearly. In Graham v. St. Charles Street Railway of these cases recovers for injury done to (47 La. Ann. 214) defendant's foreman posted his business right by some interference by a notice to the effect that he would discharge the defendant which he cannot justify as employees who should continue to deal with fair competition. The right of every man the plaintiff grocer. The court held that in any business to adequate protection of his such unjustifiable interference with the probable expectancy is therefore well estab grocer's business constituted an actionable lished; but equally well recognized is the wrong, Chief Justice Nichols saying: "In necessary justification of any damage caused so doing the defendant would not only a business rival in the regular course of fair control their own will, action, and conduct, competition.1 It is therefore because of an underlying but forcibly control and change from pure motives of malice the choice and will of public policy that lawful competition will others through fear of non-employment or 1 One is quite justified by modern authority discharge. This will and power of choice, in basing everything upon the fundamental both the plaintiff and the parties them theory that intentional interference with business selves are entitled to have left free, and not rights is prima facte a clear tort, so that unless coerced in order to simply work the former plain justification be sufficiently shown, action lies. See, among many others, the following damage and injury." cases: Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; HollenOn the other hand, in Robinson v. Texas beck v. Ristine, 114 Iowa, 358; London Guaranty Pine Land Association (40 S. W. Rep. Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493; Ertz v. Produce Ex 843), where the defendant gave notice that change, 79 Minn. 140. These principles are most it would discharge employees who did not elaborately worked out in the long series of able opinions in Massachusetts culminating at the trade at its store but dealt with the present writing with Pickett v. Walsh, 78 N. E. plaintiff, the court held that there was no 753. And it is stated with the utmost accuracy in actionable wrong. As Chief Justice James the New Jersey decisions, particularly in Jersey said: "If the defendant could so control its City Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N J. Eq. 769. This general theory is strongly opposed in employees as to prevent their dealing with recent by the majority opinions in Allen v. plaintiff, or so control their wages as to Flood, times 1898 A. C. 1, and in National Assn. v. divert them from the channels of the plain-, Cummings, 170 N. Y 315. Payne v. Railroad, 3 tiffs' business in favor of his own, we know Lea. 507, and Raycroft v. Taynter, 68 Vt. 219, no rule making it actionable. Had the seem to be based upon this opposite theory. But defendant no proper interest of his own to Guethler v. Altman, 26 Ind. App. 587 and Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225, usually cited to the subserve in so doing, but had acted wantonly same effect, are plainly distinguishable at least, in causing loss to plaintiff, the rule would as there was certainly sufficient justification for have been different. The fact that defen the interference shown in the facts of those cases.