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THE GREEN BAG

rights, and praying for a decree ordering con veyances to himself. The answer and cross-bill of defendants alleged the trust character of the property and prayed for a decree establishing that fact. Then other complications arose. Cer tain persons claiming to be creditors of Dowie filed a petition in the United States District Court, alleging Dowie to be bankrupt. The par ties to the Dowie action for recovery of the property, which had been brought in the Illinois State Court, entered into a stipulation transferring that action to the United States District Court to be determined in connection with bankruptcy matter. Questions of jurisdiction arising, the whole controversy was, by further stipulation, transferred to the Circuit Court. That court came to the conclusion that the property should be decreed to be in trust and therefore not subject to bankruptcy proceedings against Dowie per sonally. A receiver was appointed to care for the business interests involved and then the court took up the question of the leadership of the society. In passing on this question, it said, "It is a general rule that a court will recognize the action of a religious society in this respect and this court does not assume to usurp the power of selection in the pending cause. Inasmuch, however, as the organization has no regulation providing how this should be done, it seems fair that the majority rule should prevail." An election was, therefore, ordered to be held under charge of officers appointed by the court for that purpose; all male and female members of the church over twenty-one years of age being granted the right to vote. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. (Contracts of Adoption.) Iowa. — In Chehak v. Battles, no N. W. Rep. 330, is an interesting discussion as to what contracts of adoption will be specifically enforced where they involve the property rights of the party adopting. The contract in question provided generally that in consideration of the giving over of the child the party adopting would bring her up as would natural parents and that such child would have all the rights of inheri tance by law. On the death of the party adopt ing it turned out that the contract was not ac knowledged, and hence, under the statute, was not a valid instrument of adoption. Suit how ever, was brought to specifically perform the con tract in respect to the property rights involved, on the ground that the giving over of the child was a part performance of the contract within the statute of frauds, and that the consideration was ample. The court in disposing of the ques tion of the consideration of such contracts quoted from Godine v. Kidd, 19 N. Y. S. 33s, and said

further, in respect to the clause of the contract of adoption providing for the inheritance of the child, that it did not purport to declare that her status would be such as to entitle her to inherit, but merely that, as a consideration on the part of the party adopting, she should acquire a por tion of their property to be determined definitely at their death. The following cases in which contracts of adoption were involved in equity were cited and discussed; Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa 578, 9 N. W. 907; Vanduyne v, Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142; Winne v. Winne, 59 N. E. 842, 82 Am. St. Rep. 647; Kofka v. Rosicky, 59 N. W. 788; 25 L. R. A. 207, 43 Am. St. Rep. 685; Sharkey v. McDermott, 4 S. W. 107, 60 Am. Rep. 270; Wright v. Wright, 58 N. W. 54, 23 L. R. A. 196; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651, 81 S. W. 895. The court upholds the contention that such contract is not within the statute of frauds, since the surrender of the child is a part performance; also that it is not testamentary in its nature so as to be affected by the statute relating to the execution of wills, and upholds the petition for specific performance. STATUTES. (Validity.) Wash. — In State v. Superior Court, 88 Pac. Rep. 207, the Supreme Court of Washington passes on the validity of a statute of that state relating to the deportation of insane persons. Affidavits had been filed before the judge of the Superior Court of King County alleging that a couple of persons confined in the jail on the charge of murder were then insane and asking appointment of a commission to pass on the question of sanity. Such com mission sustained the allegations in the affidavits referred to and reported to the court that the prisoners were insane. The court was about to enter an order in accordance with the findings of the commission and to direct the deportation of the prisoners to the state of Oregon when the prosecuting attorney applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition alleging that the proceedings had were invalid. The Supreme Court held the proceedings relating to the deter mination of the question of sanity regular and authorized by law but, although the question on the validity of the statute authorizing the depor tation was not raised by the record, it said that "being a question of public importance which might disturb the friendly relations of the sister state, the majority of this court believe that it should be carefully considered." It said that notwithstanding the court might direct the sheriff to deport the prisoners to their home in an adjoin ing state, the officer's powers would cease imme diately on his crossing the state boundary and